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Abstract
Anthropologists have long documented substantial and persistent differences across social groups in the preferences and taboos for particular foods. One natural question to ask is
whether such food cultures matter in an economic sense. In particular, can culture constrain
caloric intake and contribute to malnutrition? To answer this question, I first document that
inter-state migrants within India consume fewer calories per Rupee of food expenditure compared to their non-migrant neighbors, even for households with very low caloric intake. I then
form a chain of evidence in support of an explanation based on culture: that migrants make
nutritionally-suboptimal food choices due to cultural preferences for the traditional foods of
their origin states. First, I focus on the preferences themselves and document that migrants
bring their origin-state food preferences with them when they migrate. Second, I link together
the findings on caloric intake and preferences by showing that the gap in caloric intake between
locals and migrants is related to the suitability and intensity of the migrants’ origin-state food
preferences: the most adversely affected migrants (households in which both husband and
wife migrated to a village where their origin-state preferences are unsuited to the local price
vector) would consume 7 percent more calories if they possessed the same preferences as their
neighbors.
JEL CODES: I10, O10, Z10, D12.
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Introduction
Anthropologists have long documented substantial and persistent differences across social

groups in the preferences and taboos for particular foods. For example, Harris (1985) analyzes the
historic origin of the taboo on beef consumption that persists among Hindus today, while Prakash
(1961) notes that the relative preference for wheat in Northwest India and rice in East India dates
back to the first millennium A.D.. One natural question to ask is whether such food cultures matter
in an economic sense.1 In particular, can culture constrain caloric intake and contribute to malnutrition? Such a question is of interest both for understanding the value that households place on
their culture, and for designing effective policies to improve nutrition.
A stark example of the willingness of households to trade off cultural food preferences for
nutrition, and an ineffective policy that did not take such preferences into account, comes from
the report of the Famine Inquiry Commission. The commission was established in the aftermath
of the 1943 Bengal Famine in which between 1.5 and 4 million Bengalis died. The final chapter of
the commission’s report centered on the role of regional preferences in exacerbating the famine:
During the famine large supplies of wheat and millets were sent to Bengal ... but
efforts to persuade people to eat them in their homes in place of rice met with little
success ... we visited numerous grain stores in which quantities of wheat were deteriorating for lack of demand. ... The problem of how to wean rice-eaters from their
determined preference from a food in short supply and reluctance to turn to alternative grains is not peculiar to Bengal, but is of all-India importance. (Famine Inquiry
Commission, 1945)
The goal of this paper is to understand whether culture can constrain caloric intake and contribute to malnutrition. In order to do so, I require a setting where people are sufficiently hungry
that reductions in caloric intake can have health, and hence economic, repercussions.2 Accordingly, I focus on India, where I observe many households on the edge of malnutrition. This setting
allows me to investigate whether culture can constrain caloric intake by observing the number of
calories hungry households forgo in order to accommodate their food culture. My analysis compares the consumption patterns of interstate migrants with those of their non-migrant neighbors
who face the same prices but possess different cultural food preferences. This methodology al1 Since

the types of food that a group of people traditionally consumes embody the preferences, beliefs and social
attitudes of the group, I will describe differences in food preferences across groups as different food cultures. This definition accords the existing definitions of culture in the economics literature. For example, Fernández (2011) “consider
differences in culture as systematic variation in beliefs and preferences across time, space or social groups”, and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2006) define culture as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social
groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation”. Given the strong persistence in food preferences
across generations described in Atkin (Forthcoming), both definitions of culture are applicable in my context.
2 As low caloric intake directly reduces productivity, health, and immunity to diseases (e.g. Fogel, 1994), the economic consequences are obvious. From a welfare perspective, households may be optimally trading-off nutrition and
cultural practices. Alternatively, since many of the gains from proper nutrition arise later in life (e.g. Almond and
Currie, 2010), uninformed parents may undervalue such gains when making food choices for their children. In this
scenario, culture can constrain both nutrition and welfare.
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lows me to broadly quantify the “costs” that culture can impose. To the best of my knowledge this
paper is the first to attempt such a quantification exercise.
To carry out such an analysis, I require information on household food consumption coupled
with the migrant status of household members. The 1983 and 1987-88 Indian National Sample
Surveys prove ideal for this purpose as 250,000 households were asked about their migration
particulars and their purchases of 169 different food products.
My analysis proceeds in four stages. In the first stage, I provide the background to my study. I
focus on India during a period when childhood malnutrition rates were above 50 percent and 64
percent of households consumed fewer calories than the nutritional adequacy requirements used
to determine India’s poverty line. If undernourished households are not maximizing nutrition in
this context, it is important to understand why. The example of rice and wheat provides suggestive evidence that culture constrains nutrition in this context. Despite these two cereals providing
a similar number of both calories and micro-nutrients per Rupee, there is dramatic regional variation in rice and wheat consumption. For example, the relative price of rice and wheat is similar
in the states of Kerala and Punjab, yet Keralans consumed thirteen times more rice than wheat
and Punjabis ten times more wheat than rice. As discussed in Atkin (Forthcoming), agro-climatic
endowments coupled with habit formation can explain how these different food cultures developed. In terms of the costs of these cultural preferences, a crude counterfactual shows that mean
Indian caloric intake could be 6.1 percent higher if households in some rice-loving states switched
the quantity of rice and wheat that they were consuming (and vice versa for wheat-loving states),
and spent any cost savings on the cheaper of the two grains.
Although suggestive, such an approach may be misleading if foods which are strong complements with rice or wheat have different prices across India. The behavior of inter-state migrants
provides more compelling evidence that culture can constrain caloric intake. The key observation
for my empirical strategy is that migrants face the same prices as their neighbors but are likely
to bring their cultural food preferences with them when they migrate. A quirk of India’s data
collection procedure ensures that households are surveyed in groups of ten drawn from blocks of
no more than 180 proximate households within a village, town or city. This feature allows me to
compare migrant and non-migrant households who face very similar prices (an assumption I test
using household unit values). In this setting, finding that migrants consume fewer calories than
otherwise-similar locals provides the first piece of evidence that households are willing to forgo
calories to accommodate their cultural preferences.
The second stage of the analysis presents this finding: migrant households consume fewer
calories per person compared to non-migrant households in the same village (conditioning on
household food expenditures, characteristics and demographics in a flexible manner). The average level of this “caloric tax” (the percentage gap in caloric intake between locals and migrants)
is equal to 1.6 percent of caloric intake. Reassuringly, I find a similar caloric tax when I compare
households where the wife migrated across a state boundary at the time of marriage to households where the wife also moved village at the time of marriage but stayed within her own state
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(a comparison in which the two sets of households appear very similar in terms of observables and
hence are likely to be similar in terms of unobservables as well).3 I also find no evidence that the
caloric tax is restricted to well-nourished households for whom reductions in caloric intake have
no nutritional consequences: the magnitude of the tax ranges between 1 and 1.7 percent when I
only consider households that are particularly poor or undernourished, or households with small
children for whom caloric shortfalls are particularly harmful.
The third stage of the analysis investigates why migrants consume fewer calories than nonmigrants. I form a chain of evidence showing that migrants are making nutritionally-suboptimal
food choices due to cultural preferences for the traditional foods of their origin states. First, I focus
on the preferences themselves. I document that migrants bring their origin-state food preferences
with them. In particular, I show that compared to other households in the same village, the foodbudget shares of a migrant household are more-closely correlated with the average food-budget
shares of their origin state. Furthermore, these preferences for the foods of their origin state are
more pronounced when both husband and wife are migrants (as opposed to just one of these two
being migrants). Second, I combine these preference results with caloric tax results of the second
stage. I show that the heterogeneity in the size of the migrant caloric tax is related to the suitability
and intensity of their origin-state food preferences: the caloric tax is only present when the average bundle of the migrant’s origin state provides fewer calories than the local bundle (both priced
at the village price vector), and increases in size when both husband and wife are migrants. In
terms of magnitudes, the migrant households whose cultural preferences put them at the biggest
disadvantage (i.e. both husband and wife migrated to a village where the typical origin-state
bundle provides fewer calories per Rupee than the local bundle) face a caloric tax of 7.0 percent.
The caloric tax for this group remains a substantial 5.2 percent when I restrict my analysis to undernourished households. These are substantial magnitudes. If this group of migrant households
possessed the same preferences as locals, the percentage consuming nutritionally inadequate diets
would fall from 58 to 47 percent.
Finally, the fourth stage of the analysis rules out two alternative explanations. Migrants may
simply have poor information about the local alternatives to their origin-state foods. Alternatively,
migrants may not possess the technologies, such as cooking equipment or recipes, needed to make
high-quality meals from the locally-cheap foods. Both these explanations generate a link between
the size of the caloric tax and the typical bundle of the migrant’s origin state, but do not rely on
migrant and non-migrant households having different cultural preferences. Under these alternative explanations, the caloric tax should not persist many years after migration or be present if
there are non-migrants in the household who are familiar with the local foods. Similarly, the size
of the tax should be smaller for more educated households. I find no evidence for any of these
hypotheses. Finally, since women are typically in charge of food purchasing and preparation in
Indian households, the tax should be smaller when only the husband is a migrant compared to
3 Such

a comparison also mitigates potential selection problems that arise when household heads are choosing to
migrate for better employment opportunities or because they are particularly adaptable to different cultures.
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when only the wife is a migrant. In fact, I find the opposite result, consistent with migrants bringing their origin-state preferences with them and husbands having greater bargaining power in
household decision making.
This set of results suggests that migrants in India consume fewer calories than non-migrants
because they prefer to purchase the traditional products from their origin state even when these
products are relatively expensive compared to local alternatives. The finding that culture can have
economically significant costs is likely to be true in many other contexts. However, there are also
scenarios where culture can have positive effects on nutrition (an effect I find for the subset of
migrants with preferences particularly well-suited to the local price vector). And, of course, the
magnitudes I find are specific to the context of migrants within India.4
For policymakers, this paper shows that effective policies for combating malnutrition should
take culture into account. I discuss the policy implications further in the conclusion.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, it adds to the growing literature on the importance of culture, a topic surveyed in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) and Fernández (2011).
In using the behavior of migrants to examine the influence of culture on household decisions, it
is particularly closely related to Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) and Fernández and Fogli’s
(2009) studies of female labor force participation and Giuliano’s (2007) study of family living arrangements. In contrast to this strand of the literature, which typically demonstrates that culture
can influence behavior, my approach allows me to quantify the costs that culture can impose.
As nutrition impacts economic growth (Fogel, 1994), the paper is also closely related to Algan
and Cahuc’s (2010) study of the relationship between culture and economic growth; and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales’s (2004) study on the link between culture and financial development.
Second, I add to the literature on the persistence of food preferences initiated by Staehle (1934),
with recent contributions by Bronnenberg, Dube and Gentzkow (2012) and Logan and Rhode
(2010). Although these papers document that migrants bring their food preferences with them,
none of them explore the nutritional consequences of such preferences. Finally, this study is related to Nunn and Qian’s (2011) study of the impact of New World potatoes on the Old World.
Their finding of large take up of a new crop over hundreds of years and consequent nutritional
improvements suggests that the persistent food culture I find may weaken over many generations.
In a companion paper, I provide theoretical and empirical evidence for the existence of regional
food preferences in India.5 The two papers differ in that Atkin (Forthcoming) lays out a model
in which the combination of agroclimatic endowments and habits generate regional food tastes
that favor the locally-abundant foods, and then explores the implications for the gains from trade
liberalization. In contrast, this paper takes India’s regional food preferences as given, interprets
these as cultural phenomena and investigates their influence on caloric intake.
I layout the remainder of the paper in the following manner. Section 2 introduces the dataset
and provides a short review of the literature on cultural food preferences in India. Drawing on
4 If

migrants are more adaptable to other cultures than non-migrants, focusing on migrants may provide a lower
bound measure of the calories households are willing to forgo to accommodate their cultural preferences.
5 Both this paper and Atkin (Forthcoming) formed part of my Ph.D. thesis.
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this literature, I provide motivating evidence that households are trading-off nutrition for culture.
Section 3 explains how I use migrants in my empirical strategy to identify the caloric costs of
culture. Section 4 presents my main result, that migrant households consume fewer calories than
comparable non-migrant households. Section 5 presents evidence that this finding is driven by
migrants making nutritionally-suboptimal food choices due to preferences for the favored foods
of their origin states. Section 6 rules out the two non-cultural explanations. Finally, section 7
discusses the implications of my findings and concludes.

2

Background on consumption patterns and caloric intake across India
In this section, I present two findings that motivate the subsequent analysis. First, the median

Indian household consumes far fewer calories than the recommended caloric intake, consistent
with the extremely high levels of childhood malnutrition observed in health and nutrition surveys.
Second, despite this setting, Indian households seem to be making food choices driven by culture
even when these choices result in reduced caloric consumption.

2.1

Data description
My analysis draws on two cross-sections of the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) col-

lected by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO): the 38th round (1983) and the 43rd
round (1987-1988). These are the only two rounds of publicly available surveys in which the same
household is asked both about their consumption of a broad set of foods as well as about their
migration particulars.6 Each survey round contains approximately 80,000 rural households (located in 8,000 villages) and 45,000 urban households (located in 4,500 urban blocks). I stack the
two cross-sections and create a combined data set containing 245,334 households. To simplify the
exposition, I will use the word village to refer to the lowest geographic identifier (a village in a
rural area but actually a block in an urban area).
The surveys record household expenditures and quantities purchased in the last 30 days (as
well as quantities consumed out of home-grown stock and gifts, both valued at the prevailing
local prices) for each food item. There are 169 different food items, including 12 products made
from rice or wheat, 9 types of pulse, 7 milk products and many vegetables, spices and meats. I
obtain calorie data for each household by multiplying each food’s caloric content, estimated by
the NSSO, by the quantity consumed over the previous 30 days. I use this number (along with the
size of the household from the household roster) to calculate the daily caloric intake per household
member.7 The surveys also provide information on household demographics and characteristics,
6 The migration questions are part of the employment and unemployment schedule, schedule 10. In contrast, the
consumption data are collected in the Consumer Expenditure schedule, schedule 1. In more recent survey rounds,
these two schedules were no longer filled out by the same households.
7 These numbers are likely to overestimate actual caloric intake. Some of these calories are wasted (due to spoilage
or simply thrown away) or fed to servants, pets and guests. If wastage rates are higher for migrant households as they
are less familiar with local foods, my estimates in later sections may underestimate the difference in caloric intake be-
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as well as expenditures on non-food items. Finally, the NSS provides survey weights in order to
make the sample nationally representative, and all the statistics I report use these weights.

2.2

Malnutrition in India
Indian households in 1983 and 1987-88 consume a small number of calories. The mean caloric

intake is 2224 per person per day across the two samples. In order to get a sense of magnitudes,
recent figures covering the period 2006-2008 were 3750 calories per person per day for the United
States, 2990 for China, and 2360 for India (FAO, 2008).
India drew the poverty line it still uses today based on the calorie norms required for a nutritionally adequate diet. These norms were set at 2400 calories per person per day for rural India
and 2100 calories per person per day for urban India.8 Using this simple indicator of household
nutrition, 66.4 percent of rural households and 59.6 percent of urban households in my sample are
undernourished. Many households lie substantially below these levels with 45.5 percent of households consuming fewer than 2000 calories and 35.6 percent consuming fewer than 1850 calories
per person per day. The upper panel of Figure I shows the full distribution of caloric intake.
While there is an imperfect mapping between my measure of caloric intake and malnutrition,
these low levels of caloric intake are consistent with the extremely high child-malnutrition rates
in India. The first wave of the National Family Health Survey was administered in 1992-1993. The
survey measured and weighed around 35,000 children under age 4 and found that 53.4 percent
were moderately to severely underweight, and 52.0 percent were moderately to severely stunted.
These numbers imply a higher prevalence of under nutrition than in Sub-Saharan Africa (Deaton
and Drèze, 2009), and suggest that a substantial number of Indian households were living on the
edge of malnutrition at the time of the surveys.

2.3

Cultural preferences for food in India
In this subsection, I provide suggestive evidence that despite these low levels of caloric intake

and high child-malnutrition rates, households seem to be making nutritionally-suboptimal food
choices in part due to cultural preferences for certain foods.
The first thing to note is that almost all households could have purchased a bundle providing the recommended caloric norms for a smaller outlay than they actually spent on food. For
example, if every household spent all their income on the item in their consumption bundle that
provided the most calories per Rupee, then the percentage of households below the recommended
caloric norms would fall to 9.5 percent (compared to the 64.9 percent in the actual data). Alternatively, if every household spent the same amount per calorie as the household in their village
with the highest caloric intake per Rupee, only 39.2 percent of households would be consuming
tween migrants and non-migrants. Actual caloric absorption will be even lower than actual caloric intake if household
members have ailments such as diarrhea or gastroenteritis that prevent the body from fully absorbing the calories.
8 Poverty lines were set in 1978 at the average per-capita expenditure of NSS households consuming this number of
calories, and are now updated each year using the inflation rate.
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below the caloric norms. However, both of these bundles are likely to be deficient in other nutrients such as proteins and vitamins, as well as highly monotonous. Therefore, the fact that some
households are not purchasing the most calorically-efficient bundle does not imply that they are
making nutritionally-suboptimal food choices based on cultural considerations. Households may
simply be maximizing nutrition and a taste for variety.
A review of the literature on cultural food preferences in India provides important background
to my paper and motivates a more convincing counterfactual.
2.3.1

Review of the literature on cultural food preferences in India

It will be important for my analysis that there are many different food cultures within India,
and that these food cultures differ across states. The field of nutritional anthropology has identified many different food cultures across religious, caste and ethnolinguistic groups within India. I
provide examples below of these different food cultures before explaining how the regional taste
differences that these food cultures generate fit into economic definitions of culture.
Chakravarti (1974) combines fieldwork and survey evidence to categorize many dimensions
of food culture in India, while Harris (1985) and Nair (1987) and Simoons (1994) focus narrowly
on animal consumption. It is here, in the attitude towards animal products, where cultural food
preferences vary most dramatically across India. Of the major religious groups in India, Jains
and Buddhists are generally vegetarian due to a belief in non-violence towards animals. Christians, Sikhs and Muslims eat animal products although the latter will not eat pork. For the Hindu
majority that comprises over 80 percent of the population, adherence to vegetarianism differs
by caste.9 Typically, members of the Brahmin (priest) and Vaishya (trading) castes are vegetarian while members of the Kshatriya (warrior) and Kayasthas (service) castes are non-vegetarian.
Lower caste households vary in attitudes towards meat eating, with some groups even consuming
beef, a taboo food for most Hindus.
However, this categorization by caste masks substantial regional heterogeneity. For example,
Hindus of all castes eat meat in the parts of the far north states of Himchal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh
and Jammu and Kashmir. Brahmin Hindus in West Bengal consume both fish and goat but not
chicken which is taboo. Meanwhile, Brahmins in Assam further east do eat chicken, as well as fish
and goat. Chakravarti (1974) argues that it is difficult to provide a single explanation for this diversity of attitudes and hypothesizes that interactions with neighboring cultures, local geography
and adherence to different Hindu deities all play roles.10
There are also differences in the acceptance of non-meat items. Vegetarians in some parts of
India consume eggs but others, such as Gujaratis who follow Swaminarayan, will not. In addition,
many North Indians avoid eggs in summer believing them to be a “hot” food that can harm the
body by raising its temperature. Conversely, “cold” foods such as citrus fruits, are avoided in
9 There

are several justifications for Hindu vegetarian practices: the principle of non-violence towards animals
(Simoons, 1994, p. 6), and the purifying “satvic” properties of cereals and most vegetables (Khare, 1992, p. 208).
10 For example, the goddess Varahi is particularly revered in West Bengal and is depicted holding a fish, potentially
explaining why Brahmins eat fish in that state.
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winter when they may cause colds and pneumonia (Chakravarti, 1974; Pool, 1987). In general,
balancing “hot” and “cold” foods is believed to be necessary for the body’s well-being (except for
pregnant women for whom hot foods are harmful and cold foods beneficial). However, as Nag
(1994) catalogs in detail, which precise foods are classified as hot and which foods cold varies
dramatically across regions. For example groundnut is perceived as hot in Tamil Nadu but cold in
Gujarat. There is also substantial regional diversity in beliefs regarding milk consumption, even
within areas where bovines were historically used for agricultural production (Simoons, 1970).11
Attitudes towards vegetables also vary considerably across India. High caste and strict Hindus
in the north of India will refrain from eating plants in the Allium genus like onions and garlic
which are thought to overexcite passions (an aversion shared by some Jains and Buddhists), while
in the south of India onion is often permitted but not garlic (Behura, 1962; Simoons, 1998). There
is similar variation in the consumption of mushrooms as some high caste Hindus consider them
unclean since they grow in dung. Simoons (1998) even highlights regional variations in attitudes
towards eating potatoes, salt and the legume urd.
Regional taste differences of the kinds described above fit squarely within the definitions of
culture used in the economics literature. Fernández (2011) defines differences in culture as “systematic variation in beliefs and preferences across time, space or social groups”. The variation
in food preferences across states of India certainly fits this definition since state boundaries were
drawn primarily along major ethnolinguistic divisions. Furthermore, many of India’s religious
minorities are concentrated in particular states. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) define culture as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly
unchanged from generation to generation”. Since adult food preferences are determined in part
by the foods consumed in childhood, and adults choose which foods are fed to their children,
the variation in food preferences across states of India also fits this second definition of culture.12
Accordingly, this paper treats regional and cultural food preferences as synonymous.
2.3.2

Rice and wheat consumption across India

I now turn to cereals, the major category of food consumption omitted in the above discussion
and the one most relevant for nutrition. Rice and wheat are the two dominant carbohydrates
in India, together accounting for an enormous 65.5 percent of total caloric consumption in my
sample. The NSS data provides strong empirical evidence of regional differences in preferences
for rice and wheat. The upper panel of Figure II plots the relative consumption of rice and wheat
calories against the relative price of rice and wheat calories for the 22,148 villages where I observe
both rice and wheat purchases.13 Although the relationship between relative price and relative
11 Of

course, unlike every other example in this section, there is a strong genetic component to variation in milk
consumption since some adult populations are lactose intolerant. In my empirical work, I will not be able to separate
genetic variation in lactose tolerance across states from variation in cultural preferences for milk across states.
12 Birch (1999) surveys the evidence from the psychology and nutrition literature which finds that adult food preferences form in part through consumption in childhood.
13 I exclude 2698 villages because I observe zero purchases of either rice or wheat, and hence do not know the
relative price. These villages would likely strengthen my findings if included since they possess extreme preferences
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quantity is downward sloping, by drawing horizontal lines across the plot it is obvious that for
most of the observed price ratios there are some villages consuming relatively large quantities of
rice and others relatively large quantities of wheat. This observation applies both when rice is a
relatively cheap calorie source compared to wheat and when it is relatively expensive.
Regional preferences for rice and wheat in India are well documented in the nutritional anthropology literature. As highlighted in the introduction, even in 300 A.D. inhabitants of Northwest
India around 300 A.D. were known for their special liking of wheat while inhabitants of East India were known for their love of rice (Prakash, 1961). Chakravarti (1974) classifies modern India
into three divisions based on food habits for cereals: rice consuming areas in east and along the
south and south-west coastline of India, bread consuming areas in the north and northwest of the
country, and rice and bread consuming areas in the center of the country.
As an illustrative example, the lower panel of Figure II highlights two states with substantial
price overlap, Kerala in the south and Punjab in the north. Keralans consumed thirteen times
more rice than wheat and Punjabis ten times more wheat than rice at similar relative prices (the
Kerala fixed effect in a regression of rice budget shares on relative prices for households in the two
states is a massive 0.80).
Do these regional preferences for rice and wheat in India mean that households are consuming
fewer calories than they could if they only cared about nutrition and dietary variety? To answer
this question, I perform the following counterfactual. For every household, I calculate the amount
it would cost to purchase a bundle with the same total quantity of calories they currently obtain
from rice and wheat but swapping the quantities of rice and wheat.14 For 42 percent of households,
this bundle would cost less than they currently spend on rice and wheat. These are the households
in the north-east and south-west quadrants of the upper panel of Figure II (with 94 percent of the
switchers in the north-west quadrant). For this subset of households, I calculate the hypothetical
caloric intake if the household allocated the cost savings to the cheaper of the two foods. I set the
hypothetical and actual caloric intake equal for the remaining 58 percent of households. For the
average household, the hypothetical caloric intake is 6.2 percent higher than their actual intake.
This gap between actual and hypothetical caloric intake provides a measure of the number of
calories households forgo in order to accommodate their preferences for rice or wheat.
This counterfactual solves several of the problems associated with the cruder counterfactuals
at the start of this subsection. First, by switching the quantities allocated to rice and wheat, the
amount of dietary variety is not declining (in the sense that every household still obtains the
same number of calories from the less-consumed food). Second, these two foods provide a similar
number of calories per Rupee and contain a similar set of nutrients. Therefore, switching between
rice and wheat does not alter household nutrition along other dimensions.15
for rice or wheat. Relative consumption is the share of rice calories in total rice and wheat calories consumed by sample
households in the village. The relative price is the log of the ratio of the median caloric unit values (i.e. expenditures
divided by calories) across purchasing households.
14 For households that don’t consume both rice and wheat, I use the village median price as the price for the unpurchased cereal. As before, I restrict attention to the villages where I observe both rice and wheat purchases.
15 The average unit value for rice was 0.95 Rupees per 1000 calories in 1983 and 1.09 in 1987/88. The equivalent
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Although informative, some of the switching households may prefer rice or wheat for idiosyncratic reasons, rather than because of the regional preferences which have a cultural dimension to
them. In order to highlight the cultural dimension, I classify states as having either “rice-loving”
or “wheat-loving” cultures. Atkin (Forthcoming) shows that, over many generations, the process
of habit formation leads to regional preferences for the foods the region is relatively well-suited to
produce. Therefore, I utilize measures of land suitability from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones
project (GAEZ) to proxy for each state’s rice/wheat culture. The GAEZ data report the suitability
of each state in India for growing both rice and wheat on a scale of 0 (not suitable) to 1 (very high
suitability).16 Consistent with the preferences for wheat and rice highlighted above, Punjab is better suited to wheat production and Kerala to rice (the difference between the crop-suitability score
for rice and wheat is 0.29 in Kerala and -0.13 in Punjab). Reassuringly for my proxy, land suitability strongly predicts relative consumption of rice and wheat across states, even after conditioning
on relative prices: A simple OLS regression of the household rice budget share on both relative
rice prices at the village level and the state-level relative suitability for growing rice (the difference
between the score for rice and wheat) yields a coefficient of 0.97 with a t-value of 149.41.
I label states as possessing a rice-loving culture if their GAEZ suitability measures are higher
for rice than wheat, and a wheat-loving culture otherwise. With these labels in hand, I redo the
counterfactual but only allow two types of consumer to switch their consumption patterns: households who are consuming more rice than wheat in states with a rice-loving culture but where
wheat is a cheaper calorie source than rice, and households consuming more wheat than rice in
states with a wheat-loving culture but where rice is cheaper than wheat. Allowing only these two
types of household to switch around their rice and wheat consumption, I estimate that Indian
households are forgoing 6.1 percent higher caloric intake in order to accommodate their cultural
preferences.17 Figure I plots the full distribution of caloric intake under the counterfactual, as well
as a histogram of the caloric gains generated. If the foregone calories were realized, the percentage
of households consuming less than the recommended caloric norms would fall by 7.3 percent. Of
course, if many households did switch across rice and wheat, local prices would change and the
actual gain in caloric intake would likely be smaller.
numbers for wheat were 0.66 and 0.75. According to the NSS, rice contained 3460 calories per kilogram, 75 grams of
protein and 5 grams of fat. The equivalent numbers for wheat where 3410, 121 and 17. Wheat has slightly more fiber
and vitamins, particularly folic acid. Thus, if anything, wheat is more nutritious than rice. As the caloric gains in the
counterfactual come almost entirely from households switching from rice to wheat, nutrition is also likely to improve
along other dimensions with the switch.
16 The particular measure I use is the “crop suitability index” for rain-fed agriculture using intermediate input usage. The GAEZ website http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZv3.0/ contains further details. Data are only
available for 28 of the 31 states. For rice, my suitability measure is the maximum of the two state-level index values for
wetland and dryland rice cultivation.
17 The rice suitability measure is higher than the wheat suitability measure for 23 out of the 28 GAEZ states, and
39.5 percent of households switch in this counterfactual. Alternatively, I can classify a state as rice-loving if the state
fixed-effect in a regression of rice budget shares on relative prices is greater than 0.5. Using this measure, 25 out of
31 states are classified as rice-loving. The counterfactual results are very similar under this definition, with Indian
households forgoing 6.0 percent higher caloric intake in aggregate and 37.7 percent of households switching. In both
cases, almost all of the gains come from households in rice-loving states switching into relatively cheap wheat since
wheat is a cheaper calorie source on average.
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This last exercise provides suggestive evidence that households in India make food choices
based on cultural preferences that are suboptimal from a nutritional sense. However, since every village has a different vector of relative prices, some of these consumption patterns may be
rationalized by complex substitution patterns. For example, if coconuts are much stronger complements with rice than they are with wheat, the relatively high consumption of rice in the south
of India may be due to cheap coconuts rather than a preference for rice. In the next section, I
discuss a methodology that sidesteps this issue by considering all 169 foods in my data set and by
focusing on consumption differences between households that have different cultural preferences
yet face the same prices.

3

Empirical methodology: examining the behavior of migrants
The behavior of inter-state migrants provides more compelling evidence that culture can con-

strain caloric intake. The key idea is that migrants bring the regional preferences of their origin
state with them, yet they face the same relative prices as non-migrants in their destination state.18
If I show that migrant households consume bundles that resemble the consumption bundle of
households in their origin state and that these bundles provide fewer calories than the typical
local bundle, I can interpret the finding that migrants consume fewer calories per Rupee of food
expenditure than locals as evidence that migrants pay a “caloric tax” to accommodate their cultural food preferences. Such an interpretation is reasonable as long as migrants do indeed face
the same prices as non-migrants and value variety and other dimensions of nutrition to the same
degree as non-migrants (two issues I will address later in this section).
Inevitably, this methodology can only estimate the caloric tax that actual migrants pay. If
potential migrants are aware of this cost of migration, actual migrants are likely to face smaller
caloric taxes either because they avoid locations with particularly deleterious price vectors or because they possess particularly open-minded or flexible preferences. Hence, the potential size of
this tax may be much larger for households that choose not to migrate.
Prior to discussing the assumptions behind my identification strategy, it is useful to describe
the migration information contained in the NSS data. By design, the survey only records permanent migrations (as opposed to temporary migrations for seasonal work opportunities). The
survey asks whether the enumeration village differs from the household member’s “last usual
residence”. If so, the household member is asked the reason for migration, how long ago they
migrated and the state in which their last usual residence was located. I define inter-state migrants as households in which either the household head or their spouse moved between one of
the 31 states in India. Except where noted otherwise, I use the household head’s migration information if both the household head and the spouse emigrated. Since the household head is male
and the spouse is female in 99.7 percent of cases, I use the terms household head and husband
18 There is a long history of using migrants to identify the effects of culture.

Fernández (2011) describes the approach
in detail and reviews this literature. The use of migrants to highlight the persistence of regional food preferences was
pioneered by Staehle (1934).
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interchangeably, and the terms spouse and wife interchangeably.
Table I provides summary statistics for the dataset. Under the migrant definitions above, about
6.1 percent of households are classified as migrant households. Most of these households are longterm migrants, with 41.3 percent having migrated 20 or more years ago and only 15.2 percent
having migrated less than 5 years ago. Finally, in India there is a norm of “patrilocality” whereby
wives move in with their husband’s family upon marriage. This norm appears in the data with
the largest category of migrant households being those in which only the wife is a migrant (41.3
percent of cases). In a further 32.5 percent of cases, both the husband and wife are migrants from
the same origin state, and in only 13.2 percent of cases is the husband the sole migrant. I exploit
these norms later in this section in order to control for potential confounding factors.
The identification argument in the empirical analysis relies on the following assumptions: migrants and non-migrants living in the same geographic location face the same prices and external
environment, have the same desire for good nutrition and dietary variety, and differ only in their
food preferences (after controlling for various household expenditure measures, household demographics and observable household characteristics). I argue that these assumptions are likely
to be satisfied for the following reasons.
First, the NSSO uses a methodology that allows me to make this comparison at an extremely
disaggregated geographic level, thereby making such an assumption more tenable. In each survey
round the NSSO draws a sample of around 8,000 rural villages and 4,500 urban blocks from the
1981 census rolls and surveys 10 households in each village/block. In order to reduce the work
load for the survey enumerators, any village or urban block with more than 1200 inhabitants
(approximately 180 households) is subdivided into smaller geographical subgroups and only one
subgroup is surveyed. Thus, in a village with one surveyed migrant, I compare the migrant household to the other nine non-migrant households surveyed in the same subgroup (a subgroup which
never encompasses more than about 180 proximate households).
Second, Indian migration patterns are not concentrated along only a few specific migration
routes. If this were the case, the assumption that migrants and non-migrants have the same desire for nutrition and dietary variety may be violated. For example, suppose most migrants in
India come from Kerala and Keralans particularly value nutrition. In this scenario, if migrants
(i.e. Keralans) consume fewer calories than locals (i.e. non-Keralans) I cannot infer that they also
consume fewer nutrients. Such a concern is mitigated if migrants come from many origin states
(decreasing the likelihood that all migrants place a high value on nutrition or variety) and if migrants move in both directions between states (and so migrants and non-migrants place an equal
value on nutrition or variety). Table II displays the proportion of all migrants that moved between
every pair of origin and destination states. Unsurprisingly, the larger states in India are either the
source or destination of most of the migrant flows (and the city-state of Delhi is a major recipient).
However, the routes are dispersed with migrants moving from many different states and often in
both directions, mitigating the concerns stated above.
Third, migrants do face the same prices as non-migrants, at least after controlling for observ-
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able characteristics. Table III compares both household characteristics and prices paid across migrant and non-migrant households within the same village. I discuss the characteristic and price
comparisons in turn.
The characteristics I focus on are the set of controls used by Subramanian and Deaton (1996)
when estimating caloric elasticities using the 1983 NSS survey. I regress each characteristic on a village fixed effect and a migrant-household dummy and report the coefficient on the dummy. Compared to other households in their village, migrant households have 6.2 percent higher per-capita
expenditures, 4.5 percent higher per-capita food expenditure, and consume 1.3 percent more calories per person. Migrant households are slightly smaller, contain a larger proportion of prime-age
males, are less likely to be categorized as an agricultural laborer household, and are more likely to
be categorized as urban self-employed. In my empirical specifications, I include explicit controls
for all of these characteristics (the full set of controls are described in section 4).
The last three rows test the assumption that migrants face the same prices as non-migrants.
I calculate household-level prices by dividing household expenditure on a food by the calories
purchased. The first row shows the coefficient on a migrant-status dummy when the log price
per calorie is regressed on a product-village fixed effect and a migrant-status dummy. The second
row shows the same coefficient but including expenditure controls in the shape of a cubic in log
household food expenditure per capita (allowing the coefficients on food expenditure to differ by
survey round). The third row shows the same coefficient but with the full set of controls for food
expenditure and household characteristics described in section 4 (essentially the other variables
in Table III).19 Migrants do seem to pay about one third of one percent more than non-migrant
households in the same village buying the same product, presumably by buying slightly higher
quality levels. However, this difference is due to migrants being wealthier than non-migrants in
their village since the difference disappears once I control for household food expenditure. The
coefficient on the migrant dummy is also small and not significantly different from zero when
the characteristic controls are included in addition to food expenditure controls. Therefore, in
order to ensure that migrants and non-migrants in the same village are paying the same prices,
all my specifications will include these controls. Additionally, I reproduce my main findings after
repricing all household purchases using the village median prices to confirm that my results on
calories consumed per Rupee of expenditure are driven by differences in the foods consumed
rather than the prices paid.
After controlling for observables, migrant and non-migrant households may still differ on unobservables. As an important robustness check, I draw on an alternative sample in which migrant
and non-migrant households appear far more similar along observable dimensions, and hence are
likely to be more similar along unobservable dimensions. This sample also mitigates the potential
19 Since there are multiple products for each household, there are over 5 million observations in this regression.
Unlike the previous characteristic regressions which are weighted by household survey weights, these regressions are
weighted by the household survey weights multiplied by the food-budget share spent on that product. This weighting
ensures that more important prices are weighted more heavily, as well as ensuring that the sum of weights for each
household is equal to the household survey weight from the NSS.
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selection problems that arise when household heads are choosing to migrate for better employment opportunities or because they are particularly adaptable to different cultures.20
I take advantage of the fact that a substantial proportion of migration in India is driven by
women moving to their husband’s village at the time of marriage (Srinivas, 1980). This norm of
“patrilocality” is so prevalent that 57 percent of wives report that both their current village is not
their last usual residence and list the reason for leaving that location as “on marriage”.21 Most of
these moves occur within the same state, with wives crossing a state border at the time of marriage
in only 6 percent of cases. I exploit this variation by focusing just on households in which the wife
moved for marriage, and comparing households in which the wife moved inter-state (migrant
households) to households in which the wife moved intra-state (non-migrant households). In the
spirit of the exercise, I also exclude the households in which both the husband and the wife moved
at the same time since these households may be moving for work opportunities.
Although the same proportion of households happen to be classified as migrants in both this
“wife moved for marriage” sample and the main sample, the average migrant household differs
substantially across the samples. Table I includes descriptive statistics for both samples. Migrant
households in the wife moved for marriage sample are more likely to live in rural areas (and hence
appear more similar to the general population which is predominantly rural) and are more likely
to be long-term migrants.
Table III confirms the conjecture that migrant and non-migrant households appear more similar in the wife moved for marriage sample. Although migrant households still spend more on both
food and all goods, the difference in expenditures between migrant and non-migrant households
declines by a third. Migrant households are no longer smaller, nor do they contain a larger proportion of prime-age males. Finally, migrants pay less, not more, than non-migrants for the same
product, and these differences are miniscule and insignificant with or without controls. Therefore,
I reproduce all my main findings using this wife moved for marriage sample in order to convince the
reader that my results are not likely to be driven by unobservable differences between migrants
and non-migrants.

4

Migrants consume fewer calories per Rupee than non-migrants
In this section, I present the first empirical result: that migrant households pay a “caloric tax”.

In particular, I test the hypothesis that migrants consume fewer calories per Rupee of food expenditure compared to the non-migrant households living around them.
In order to test this hypothesis, I use the data on the consumption of all 169 foods to generate
20 To

produce my findings on caloric intake, migrants need to consume higher price per calorie foods than nonmigrants with similar incomes for reasons unrelated to the tastes of their origin state. The selection bias likely works
in the other direction. For example, migrants may be more likely to be manual laborers who consume diets heavy in
cheap carbohydrates, or migrants may have unusually adaptable and adventurous tastes.
21 In contrast, under 1 percent of male household heads moved location for the purpose of marriage. Among male
household heads who do move, 48 percent cite employment reasons and only 18 percent cite marriage (these figures
are 2 percent and 85 percent for wives).
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ln caloriesi , the log of caloric intake per person per day, for every household (where i indexes
households). I regress this measure on migranti , a dummy variable for a migrant household,
and dvt , a village-round fixed effect (where v denotes village or urban block and t denotes the
survey round). The village-round fixed effect is equivalent to a village fixed effect since villages
are anonymized and cannot be matched across the two survey rounds. Additionally, I include a
vector of household-level controls, Xi , containing a third-order polynomial in the log of the percapita food expenditure over the previous 30 days, as well as a comprehensive set of demographics
and characteristics that follow the specification used by Subramanian and Deaton (1996):
ln caloriesi = β 1 migranti + dvt + Πt Xi + ε i .

(1)

The hypothesis β 1 < 0 tests whether migrants consume fewer calories than their neighbors in the
same village, conditional on their food expenditure and other household-level controls. Given
the inclusion of log food expenditure in the controls, this test is exactly equivalent to asking if
migrants obtain fewer calories per Rupee of food expenditure than non-migrants in their village,
conditioning on food expenditure and other household-level controls.
The characteristic and demographic variables control for the possibility that, compared to
other households in the village, migrants may work in less physically-intensive jobs or have different demographic structures. Household demographics are captured by log household size as well
as the proportion of household members that fall into five sex-specific age buckets.22 The included
household characteristics are indicator variables for the household’s primary activity among the
following categories: rural self-employed in agriculture, rural self-employed in non-agriculture,
rural agricultural labor, rural other labor, rural other, urban self-employed, urban wage earner,
urban casual labor and urban other. I allow the coefficients on all these controls to differ by survey round. Subramanian and Deaton (1996) also include indicators for religion and whether the
household is a member of a scheduled caste. Since religious affiliation and caste membership may
be cultural determinants of food preferences, I do not include these as controls.
The error terms may be correlated across households within the same village and across households that share the same origin state. Therefore, both here and in the regressions that follow, I
two-way cluster the standard errors at both the village-round and origin-state level.
Column 1 of Table IV shows the results of this regression. I reject the null hypothesis, that
migrants consume an equal or greater number of calories per Rupee than non-migrants, at the
1 percent level: inter-state migrant households are consuming 1.59 percent fewer calories than
their non-migrant neighbors, controlling for food expenditure. In monetary terms, this caloric
tax on migrants is commensurate with the caloric decline due to a 2.47 percent reduction in food
expenditure for the average migrant household.23
As discussed in section 2, caloric intake is not equivalent to nutrition, and households may
22 These

age buckets are 0-4, 5-9, 10-15, 15-55 and over 55.
calculate these numbers using the round-specific coefficients on the expenditure controls combined with the
mean log per-capita food expenditure of migrants in each round.
23 I
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trade-off calorie-rich foods for protein- or vitamin-rich foods. However, there is no reason to
think that migrants would trade-off these components of a nutritious diet in a different manner to
non-migrants facing the same prices and spending the same amount on food (recall that migrants
are moving between many different states and often in both directions and so any state variation
in preferences for proteins or vitamins should sweep out in the aggregate). Thus, the smaller
number of calories per Rupee that migrants consume likely implies a lower level of nutrition.
The magnitude of the caloric tax does not mean that cultural preferences for food can only
have small impacts. First, the size of the caloric tax should depend on how costly it is for a migrant to accommodate their origin-state food preferences. If the origin-state preferences are wellsuited to the local price-vector, migrants may actually consume more calories for a given level of
food expenditure. The coefficient on migranti merely summarizes the average caloric tax faced by
migrants traveling along a multitude of routes and facing positive and negative caloric taxes.24
Second, recall that for many of these households only one member of the household (usually the
wife) migrated from another state. Any effects are likely to be more exaggerated if both husband
and wife are migrants since a greater proportion of household decision-makers possess non-local
preferences. In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I explore both these dimensions of heterogeneity and find
substantially higher caloric taxes for the more adversely affected migrant groups.

4.1

Robustness checks
The remaining columns of Table IV report a variety of robustness checks. Column 2 of Table IV

runs the specification in equation 1 on the wife moved for marriage sample, described in section 3, for
which unobservable differences between migrant an non-migrant households were less of a concern. I compare households where wives moved intra-state at the time of marriage (a non-migrant
household) with those where the wife moved inter-state (a migrant household). The caloric tax
on migrants is still significantly negative for this sample, but is attenuated by 24 percent.25 The
decline in the size of the coefficient is not surprising. These wives are typically moving into their
husband’s households (often containing other extended family members such as the husband’s
parents). Any cultural preferences brought by the wife are likely to have a smaller impact on
household spending decisions compared to the scenario where both husband and wife are migrants (a hypothesis I test in a more direct manner in sections 5.2 and 5.4).
Columns 3 to 5 of Table IV use alternative sets of expenditure controls in place of the polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure. Column 3 uses a third-order polynomial in log per-capita
expenditure on all goods. I find a migrant caloric tax of 1.36 percent. Since the coefficients are
of similar magnitude when I control for either food expenditure or total expenditure, migrant
households are not simply substituting from non-food to food expenditure in order to accom24 The average caloric tax faced by migrants will be negative if local preferences adapt through the process of habit
formation to favor whichever foods are locally inexpensive as in Atkin (Forthcoming).
25 I would also find β < 0 if wives from more distant villages are more valued and fed higher quality foods.
1
Alternatively, I would find β 1 < 0 if wives consume cheaper calorie sources than other household members, combined
with wives from further away consuming less food (or controlling a smaller share of the household budget).
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modate their food preferences. Results are similar in column 4, which uses a polynomial in log
per-capita real food expenditure, and in column 5, which allows the food expenditure elasticities
to vary by state.26
In column 6 of Table IV, I instrument the food expenditure polynomial with a polynomial in
non-food expenditure to control for potentially correlated measurement error (since both calories
and food expenditure are calculated using the same raw data).27 Food expenditure may also
be endogenous. For example, a shock that increases the demand for calories, such as changing
work patterns, will also affect food expenditure and result in a positive correlation between food
expenditure and the error term, biasing the coefficients on food expenditure upwards. However,
there will be a negative or no correlation with non-food expenditure, and so the true value of
the coefficient will be bounded between the instrumented and uninstrumented estimates. Since
the estimated β 1 is only attenuated by a quarter and still significantly negative in the instrumental
variables specification, both measurement error and the potential endogeneity of food expenditure
do not seem to be a major problem in this context.
Finally, I address the concern that migrants and non-migrants may pay slightly different prices
(recall from table III that although the difference in prices paid was insignificant after conditioning on food expenditures, it was still positive). This concern is most severe for the three foods
(rice, wheat and sugar) that are commonly sold through the subsidized Public Distribution System (PDS).28 Although the system was not restricted to households with Below Poverty Line cards
until the 1990’s, migrants may still have had worse access to this system and hence paid higher
prices for these three foods even after conditioning on quality. Column 7 reproduces my main
specification excluding these three food groups (i.e. replacing ln caloriesi and the food expenditure measures with the calories from, and expenditure on, the remaining foods). Reassuringly, I
actually find a larger caloric tax of 2.05 percent when I exclude these PDS foods. Columns 8 and 9
take a different approach to show that my results are driven by differences in the foods consumed
rather than the prices paid. Column 8 replaces ln caloriesi with ln calories_per_Rupeei , the calories
per Rupee spent on food, and includes controls for per-capita expenditure (recall that the coefficient on migranti would be identical to column 1 if per-capita food expenditure controls were
included instead). Column 9 uses the same specification but calculates ln calories_per_Rupeei by
pricing each food at the village median price for that food. I find that migrants obtain 1.45 percent
fewer calories per Rupee of food expenditure than their non-migrant neighbors, conditioning on
total expenditure, and this caloric tax is essentially unchanged at 1.49 percent when I price each
food at the village median price. Therefore, migrants consume fewer calories than locals through
purchasing different consumption bundles rather than through paying different prices.

26 Column 4 uses log per-capita food expenditure divided by a state-specific Stone price index (the sum of log prices
weighted by state budget shares). Column 5 interacts log per-capita food expenditure with state-round fixed effects.
27 The first stage is very strong with a Cragg-Donald F-statistic of 36.8.
28 I can reproduce the prices paid regressions of table III just for foods in these three groups. Although still not
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, migrants pay 0.24 percent more for these foods than nonmigrants in the same village after conditioning on the full set of controls.
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4.2

Migrants consume fewer calories even when on the edge of malnutrition
Migrants may be willing to accommodate their cultural preferences but only if they are suffi-

ciently rich and well-nourished that any foregone calories are irrelevant (and may even be beneficial). Accordingly, Table V repeats the basic specification for various sub-populations that are
poor and under-nourished (i.e. I compare the caloric intake of poor and undernourished migrant
households to that of poor and undernourished non-migrant households in the same village).
Column 1 repeats the baseline specification. Columns 2 through 4 restrict attention to undernourished households (those consuming fewer than either 1850 or 2000 calories per person
per day, or those consuming fewer calories than the 2400 rural/2100 urban calorie norms used
to calculate Indian poverty lines). Columns 5 through 8 restrict attention to poorer households
(those spending less than either the median or 25th percentile of either per-capita expenditure or
per-capita food expenditure in that survey round). Although the size of the caloric tax paid by migrants is slightly smaller for these seven subpopulations, it still lies between 1.0 and 1.7 percent.29
Nutritional shortfalls at young ages have substantial scarring effects on productivity, earnings
and health in adulthood (Almond and Currie, 2010). Thus, adequate nutrition is particularly
important for households with young children. Columns 9 through 12 restrict attention to families
with children below the age of 5 or below the age of 16. I refine both these samples further by
restricting attention only to households that are spending less than the median level of per-capita
food expenditure. In all four of these subpopulations, I find that migrant households consume
significantly fewer calories per Rupee than non-migrant households, with magnitudes ranging
between 1.3 and 1.7 percent. Given that India’s child malnutrition rates were in excess of 50
percent around this time period, these poor households with children are very likely to be on the
edge of malnutrition.
In summary, migrant households consume fewer calories per Rupee of food expenditure than
non-migrant households, even when on the edge of malnutrition.

5

Why do migrants consume fewer calories than non-migrants?
The previous section showed that migrant households consume fewer calories than compara-

ble non-migrant households and that this result holds even for households on the edge of malnutrition. In this section, I form a chain of evidence in support of an explanation based on culture:
that migrants make nutritionally-suboptimal food choices due to strong preferences for the favored foods of their origin states.
First, I focus on the preferences themselves. In section 5.1 I document that migrant households
bring their origin-state food preferences with them when they migrate and in section 5.2 I show
that the intensity of these preferences depends on whether both husband and wife are migrants
29 The

coefficients are significantly negative in all cases except when considering the bottom quartiles of total expenditure or food expenditure. In these two cases, the sample size is dramatically smaller, and the standard errors are
much higher (rather than the magnitude of the coefficients being much lower).
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(as opposed to just one of these two being migrants). Second, I combine these preference results
with the earlier results regarding caloric intake. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 find that the heterogeneity in
the size of the migrant caloric tax is related to the suitability and intensity of these origin-state food
preferences: the caloric tax is only present when the average bundle of the migrant’s origin state
provides fewer calories than the local bundle (both priced at the local price vector), and it increases
in size when both husband and wife are migrants (again compared to just one of these two being
migrants). This chain of evidence suggests that Indian migrants consume fewer calories than nonmigrants because they prefer to purchase the favored products from their origin state even when
these products are relatively expensive compared to local alternatives.

5.1

Migrants bring their food preferences with them
In this subsection, I present the first piece of evidence, that migrants bring their food prefer-

ences with them. In particular, I test the hypothesis that, compared to other households living in
the same village, a migrant household’s consumption bundle more closely resembles the average
bundle of their origin state.
I first present a simpler specification that just focuses on the consumption of rice and wheat. I
test whether the amount of rice a migrant household consumes is related to the amount of rice that
households in their origin state consume. I can do this in two ways. As is typical in the economics
of culture literature surveyed by Fernández (2011), I can just focus on migrants and test whether
migrants who come from rice-loving states spend more on rice than migrants in the same village
who come from wheat-loving states. Alternatively, I can test whether migrants who come from
states that are more rice-loving than their current state spend more on rice than locals.
I regress rice’s share of total household rice and wheat expenditure,
rice share of their origin state,

riceio
riceio +wheatio ,

ricei
ricei +wheati ,

on the average

a measure of the household’s relative preference for

rice and wheat based only on their origin state (where the origin-state average is denoted by an o
superscript and is calculated using only non-migrant households interviewed in the same survey
round as household i):30
riceio
ricei
+ dvt + Πt Xi + ε i .
= α1
ricei + wheati
riceio + wheatio

(2)

For non-migrants, the origin state rice share is simply the average rice share of their current
state. The regression specification also includes the same village fixed effects, dvt , and vector
Xi of household-level controls used in section 4.
I first restrict attention only to migrant households. Since I include village fixed effects, a
positive α1 coefficient indicates that migrants who moved from states that are more rice-loving
than the origin states of other migrants within their village consume a larger share of rice than
other migrants (and vice versa for migrants from more wheat-loving states). Column 1 of Table VI
30 When calculating the total expenditure on either rice or wheat, I include all 12 of the rice and wheat-based products

in the surveys (e.g. wheat, baking flour, cake flour, semolina flour, noodles and bread).
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contains the results of this simple regression. I find support for the hypothesis with a positive and
highly significant estimate of α1 equal to 0.189. I can also include non-migrants in the regression.
With all villagers included, a positive α1 coefficient indicates that migrants who moved from states
that are more rice-loving than their destination state consume a larger share of rice compared to
the locals in their village. Column 2 of Table VI contains the results of this regression. Once more,
I find a positive and highly significant estimate of α1 (here equal to 0.123).31
Although informative, such an exercise only incorporates information on two types of food. If
I wish to consider all 169 food items, I require a different approach to test whether migrants bring
their food preferences with them. One option is to repeat the exercise above for all 169 foods and
then aggregate the coefficients in some manner. However, the preponderance of zero quantities
for many of the less-consumed foods means that it is difficult to compare consumption across
households within the same village on a good-by-good basis.32
Instead, I propose an intuitive and transparent measure of preference similarity based on correlations between household consumption bundles and a reference consumption bundle for a
particular state. I calculate ρis = corr (bsharei , bshareis ), the correlation between the vector of 169
food-budget shares of household i (bsharei ) and the vector of average food-budget shares of a
particular state s (bshareis ). As with the rice-wheat specification, the state-averages are calculated
using only non-migrant households interviewed in the same survey round as household i (hence
the need for an i superscript on bshareis ). This budget share correlation naturally over-weights
the food items with high budget shares, a desirable property if I want to explore the link between
preference differences and differences in total caloric intake.33
These ρis correlations provide a simple measure of the similarity between household i’s preferences and the average preferences of non-migrants in state s.34 I test whether migrant and
non-migrant households possess the same preferences by comparing the size of these correlations
31 If

all households allocated expenditures on rice and wheat in the same proportions as the average household in
their origin state, the α1 coefficient would equal 1. The smaller coefficient may be a result of either migrant adaptation
to local preferences, or preferences that are not Cobb-Douglas. In unreported results, I also run both specifications
using rice calorie shares instead of expenditure shares and obtain estimates of 0.181 for the migrant-only sample and
0.118 for the full sample (both significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level).
32 If I regress the budget share of each food in the total food budget on the average food-budget share for that food
in the household’s origin state (with the same controls as in equation 2), 145 of the 180 coefficients are positive and
72 are significantly greater than zero at the 5 percent level. There are more than 169 different foods since several food
categories changed between the 38th and 43rd survey round.
∑( x y − x̄ ȳ)

33 To

see this fact, note that the correlation between vectors x and y is equal to (n−j 1j)s s where x̄ and s x denote the
x y
1
mean and standard deviation of vector x. The mean budget share for any vector is equal to 169
. Therefore “outlier”
foods with high average budget shares will typically have larger values for ∑( x j y j − x̄ ȳ) and hence be more influential.
For example, take any x and swap any two elements x1 and x2 . The correlation between the new and the old bundle
( x − x )2

equals 1 − (n1−1)2s2 and will only differ substantially from 1 if one of the swapped elements is a large part of the budget.
x
34 If households have Cobb-Douglas preferences, u = Π169 cθ g with 169 θ = 1 (where c is the consumption and θ
∑ g =1 g
g
g
g =1 g
the preference parameter for food g), my preference-similarity measure is the correlation between a household’s preference parameters and the average preference parameters of non-migrants in state s. Atkin (Forthcoming) proposes an
alternative Almost Ideal Demand System approach that allows for non-homotheticities and budget shares that respond
to prices. Such a methodology is less feasible in this context since it is difficult to estimate migrant-specific preference
when there are very few migrants from a particular origin state in a particular destination state. In the robustness
analysis, I present a modification that allows for non-homotheticities in consumption.
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across households that face the same price vector.
As a first step, I test whether, compared to other households living in the same village, a
migrant’s consumption bundle less closely resembles the average bundle of their current state
of residence. I regress the correlation ρid of a household’s bundle with their current state bundle
(labeled state d as it is a migrant’s “destination” state) on a migrant-household dummy:
ρid = β 1 migranti + dvt + Πt Xi + ε ist .

(3)

As in previous specifications, I include village fixed effects, dvt , and vector Xi of household-level
controls. A negative value of β 1 indicates that migrant households consume bundles that are less
similar to the current state bundle (in comparison to non-migrant households in the village). As
shown in column 3 of Table VI, the data support this sign prediction. I find a estimated coefficient
of -0.0111. I can reject the null hypothesis, that migrants do not differ from non-migrants in the
manner described above (β 1 ≥ 0), at the 1 percent level.35
The finding that migrants possess different preferences than non-migrants does not necessarily
imply that migrants bring with them preferences for the specific foods of their origin state. I
now test this hypothesis. I focus only on villages with migrants living in them, and compare the
similarity of the bundles of both migrants and non-migrants in the village to the migrant’s originstate bundle. To do this, I switch correlation measures to the correlation ρiov of a household’s
bundle with the bundle of the origin state of migrants within their village (where ov indicates
the origin state of migrants in village v, distinct from the o superscript which indicates the origin
state of the household itself). I regress this correlation on a dummy variable migrantiov indicating
a household that contains a migrant from state ov :
ρiov = γ1 migrantiov + dovtv + Πt Xi + ε ist .

(4)

Villages may have multiple origin states ov if there are migrants from more that one state living
there. In this scenario, there are multiple observations per household, one for each origin state in
the village. Therefore, I include a separate village fixed effect for each origin state in each village,
dovtv , in addition to the set of household-level controls used in the previous specifications.36 A positive value of γ1 indicates that migrant households originally from origin-state ov consume bundles
that are more similar to the bundle of that particular origin state ov (in comparison to how similar
the bundles of neighboring households not from ov are to the bundle of origin state ov ). As shown
35 The negative coefficient on migrant is partly mechanical since average budget shares of state d were calculated
i
using only non-migrant households. Although this bias is likely to be small (the average state-round sample contains
3,700 non-migrant households), I reproduce the regression using average bundles calculated using all households. The
β 1 coefficient remains significantly negative at the 1 percent level, rising only slightly to -0.0106.
36 As previously, I two-way cluster at the village-round and origin state o of the household. Since I compare all
households to the average bundle of a migrant’s origin state, an alternative is to cluster at the village-round and ov state level. Clustering at the household level is also sensible since there are multiple observations per household. The
standard errors are very similar under the first two clustering procedures, and smaller with household-level clustering.
Therefore, I report the more conservative standard errors that use the first procedure.
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in column 4 of Table VI, the data support this sign prediction. I estimate a positive coefficient
of 0.0226 and can reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. I find that, compared to other
households living in the same village, a migrant’s consumption bundle more closely resembles
the average bundle of the migrant’s origin state.37
I assess the magnitudes of the coefficients in the following manner. On average, migrants still
consume bundles that are more closely correlated with the reference bundle of their current state
than their origin state (the average correlations are 0.7270 and 0.6712 respectively). However, for
comparable non-migrant households, the gap between the two correlations is substantially larger
(the β 1 and γ1 coefficients imply that the current-state correlation is 0.0111 higher and the migrantstate correlation is 0.2226 lower). Therefore, migrants close about 40 percent of this dissimilarity
gap (i.e. the gap between the correlation with the current state bundle and the correlation with the
migrant state bundle).
Columns 5 through 9 of Table VI run the main regression specified in equation 3 for the wife
moved for marriage sample, for the alternative expenditure specifications detailed in section 4.1, and
for the subset of non-PDS foods. In addition to these robustness checks, my findings are robust to
using two alternative preference-similarity measures. First, migrant households may come from
different parts of the income distribution than the average household in their origin state. Since
migrants are not observed before their migration, any correction is necessarily imperfect. Column
10 presents one such correction. I recalculate the reference bundles using non-migrant households
in the same national income quartile as household i (again in the round that the household was
surveyed). Therefore, I compare the correlation between a household’s bundle and the bundle
consumed in state ov by households at similar income levels. Second, although budget shares
have the appealing feature that they map directly into parameters of the utility function if food
preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas form, column 12 calculates the correlations using vectors of
caloric shares instead (where a caloric share is a food item’s share of household caloric consumption). Results are similar across all the robustness specifications, with γ1 significantly positive in
every regression.
Finally, Table VII reports these correlation results for the various subsamples of poor and undernourished households detailed in section 4.2. Mirroring the caloric tax results, I find positive
(and significant) coefficients across the various subsamples.38
In summary, migrant households bring the cultural food preferences of their origin state with
them when they migrate.

37 There is some heterogeneity across both food types and household characteristics.

If I focus on subsets of products,
I find more substantial persistence among the 24 cereals or just rice and wheat products (γ1 coefficients equal to 0.0273
and 0.0230 respectively) than among non-cereals (a γ1 coefficient equal to 0.0159). If I include interactions between the
migrant dummy and either a rural indicator or the proportion of children in the household, I find significantly less
persistence among rural households and those with a higher proportion of children.
38 The only two exceptions are the bottom quartile of food or total expenditure subsamples in which the sample size
shrinks by more than 90 percent.
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5.2

The number of migrants in the household increases the intensity of preferences
If the results of the previous subsection are driven by cultural preferences for the foods of a

migrant’s origin state, I expect more pronounced effects when there are multiple migrants within
the household. In this subsection, I show that there are stronger preferences for origin-state foods
when both husband and wife are migrants as opposed to only one of the two (since in the former
scenario both primary decision makers in the household possess non-local preferences).
Table VIII explores the heterogeneity across these within-household migrant structures. I allow the coefficient on the migrant dummy in equation 4 to vary with household structure by
interacting migrantiov with dummies for the the migrant status of the household head and their
spouse: (1) only one of either the head or spouse is a migrant (onlyonei ), or (2) both the head and
spouse are migrants (bothi ). I treat migrant households where the head has no spouse as a third
category and also interact a no spouse dummy (nospousei ) with the migrant dummy. However,
since households with no spouse may differ from other households more generally, I also include
the no spouse dummy in the controls. Equation 4 becomes:39
ρiov

= γ1 migrantiov × onlyonei + γ2 migrantiov × bothi
+ γ3 migrantiov × nospousei + dovtv + π1t nospousei + Πt Xi + ε i .

(5)

The γ coefficients from this specification provide separate estimates of the similarity of migrant bundles to their origin-state bundle for each of these three types of migrant household.
The hypothesis at the start of the subsection corresponds to γ2 > γ1 : the similarity of migrant
consumption bundles to their origin-state reference bundle (compared to the similarity of nonmigrant bundles to the same reference bundle) is stronger when both husband and wife are migrants, and weaker when only one is a migrant. I find support for this hypothesis in Panel 1 of
Table VIII. When only only one of the husband and wife is a migrant, I obtain a coefficient on the
migrant dummy of 0.0079. In contrast the size of the caloric tax is significantly larger when both
husband and wife are migrants (a coefficient of 0.0416). I can reject the null that the coefficients on
migrantiov × onlyonei and migrantiov × bothi are equal at the 1 percent level.
In summary, migrant households exhibit stronger preferences for the foods of their origin state
if both husband and wife are migrants as opposed to only one of the two.40 Section 6 dismisses
alternative explanations for my findings based on information or technology rather than culture.
In doing so, I explore further differences in the intensity of preferences based on the gender of
the migrant, the time since migration, and the similarity of the origin-state and destination-state
bundles.
both head and spouse are migrants but come from different origin states, I replace the migrantiov indicator
variable with the value of one half for each of the two origin states. Since there are very few such households, results
are essentially unchanged if these households are dropped.
40 The focus on the migrant status of the household head and spouse, as opposed to all household members, seems
appropriate. If I supplement equation 4 with an interaction between the migrant dummy and the proportion of household members that are migrants, the interaction term is positive and highly significant. However, if I also include the
migrant structure dummies used in equation 5, the proportion of migrants interaction is no longer significant.
39 If
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5.3

The size of the caloric tax depends on the suitability of the migrant preferences
This subsection links together my two previous findings: that migrants bring their origin-state

tastes with them and that migrants consume fewer calories per Rupee than locals. I show that the
size of the caloric tax paid by migrants depends on how well-suited their origin-state preferences
are to the local price vector. In particular, I test the hypothesis that the size of the caloric tax is
larger if migrants move to a village where the preferences of their specific origin state place them
at a caloric disadvantage relative to locals.
In order to test this hypothesis, I require a measure of how calorically advantageous a certain set of origin-state preferences is. Once more, I proxy the migrant’s origin-state preferences
with their origin-state reference bundle, bshareio , a vector of average food-budget shares of nonmigrants in their origin state. I then calculate ln K (bshareio , Piv ), the log of calories derived from
1 Rupee allocated in the same proportions as this origin-state reference bundle bshareio but with
foods priced at the destination-village price vector Piv .41 Similarly, I calculate ln K (bshareiv , Piv ),
the log of calories derived from 1 Rupee allocated in the same proportions as the average bundle bshareiv of non-migrant households in the migrant’s destination village (also at destinationvillage prices). The log difference between the calories derived from each of these 1 Rupee bundles
measures the caloric advantage of a migrant’s origin-state preferences over the local preferences.
Migrants who move to villages where their origin-state average bundle is a relatively expensive
method of obtaining calories compared to the local bundle have a negative value for this log difference. These migrant households have particularly disadvantageous preferences and should face
a larger caloric tax compared to a migrant household for whom this log difference is positive.
To implement this test, I rerun my calorie regression, equation 1, except I now interact the
migrant dummy with an indicator variable, 1[ln K (bshareio , Piv ) < ln K (bshareiv , Piv )], that takes
the value of 1 for negative values of the log difference described above:
ln caloriesi = β 1 migranti + β 2 migranti × 1[ln K (bshareio , Piv ) < ln K (bshareiv , Piv )]

+ dvt + Πt Xi + ε i . (6)
The values of the log differences range from -0.62 for the 1st percentile of migrants to 0.92 for the
99th percentile, with negative values for one third of migrant households. As before, I include
village-round fixed effects, dvt , and the same vector Xi of controls for expenditure and household
demographics described in section 4.
The hypothesis at the start of the subsection corresponds to β 2 < 0: the caloric tax is more
negative if a migrant’s origin-state bundle provides relatively few calories per Rupee compared to
the local bundle. Column 1 of Table IX presents the results of this regression. I can reject the null
hypothesis at the one percent level. The estimated β 2 coefficient is significantly negative and equal
obtain the vector Piv by treating unit values (the expenditure on a food divided by the quantity purchased) as
price data. Unit values are not actual prices since quality varies. In part because of this concern, I use median village
prices as my price measure. These prices are robust to outliers and are less contaminated by quality effects. If none of
the village sample purchase a good, I use the median price at an incrementally higher level of aggregation.
41 I
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to -0.0283. The main effect, β 1 , is insignificant and close to zero. Migrants only pay a caloric tax if
they live in a village where purchasing their origin-state reference bundle provides fewer calories
than the local bundle. Summing the two coefficients, I find that migrant households living in
villages where their preference are badly suited to the local price vector consume 3.33 percent
fewer calories than comparable non-migrant households.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table IX present alternative specifications for the ln K (., .) interaction.
Column 2 allows the caloric tax to vary for migrants in each quartile of the ln K (., .) difference.
The largest caloric tax of 3.93 percent is faced by migrant households in the bottom quartile.
The size of the caloric tax becomes progressively smaller for households in the second and third
quartiles and becomes significantly positive for the top quartile.42 This top quartile of migrants
have the most advantageous origin-state preferences and receive a caloric dividend rather than
pay a caloric tax. In terms of magnitudes, these households consume 2.27 percent more calories per Rupee than their non-migrant neighbors. Column 3 interacts the migrant dummy with
ln K (bshareio , Piv ) − ln K (bshareiv , Piv ), a continuous measure of a migrant’s caloric advantage over
locals. Unsurprisingly, I find a positive and significant coefficient of 0.0629: the size of the caloric
tax increases with the caloric disadvantage of a migrant’s origin-state preferences.43
As in previous sections, I present many robustness checks and results for poor and undernourished subpopulations. The other columns of Table IX report my findings using the wife moved
for marriage subsample, alternative expenditure controls, only non-PDS foods, income-quartile
adjusted reference baskets, instrumented food expenditure, and replacing calories with calories
per Rupee calculated with both actual and village median prices. Table X contains results for
poor and undernourished subpopulations. In all 20 specifications, I find a significantly negative
β 2 coefficient. The magnitudes for migrants with disadvantageous preferences (e.g. for whom
ln K (bshareio , Piv ) < ln K (bshareiv , Piv )) range from a caloric tax of 1.87 percent for households
below median income, to a caloric tax of 3.46 percent for households consuming fewer than 2000
calories per person per day.
I perform two additional robustness tests that address particular concerns with this exercise.
One concern is that the ln K (., .) difference is related to the distance migrants have traveled and
42 The

three quartile boundaries are -0.071, 0.118 and 0.322. It is not surprising that I find a negative caloric tax for
small positive values of the ln K (., .) difference (i.e. for the third quartile). First, the origin-state bundle is an imperfect
measure of migrant preferences unless the utility function takes a Cobb-Douglas form described in footnote 34, is fixed
for life and is identical for every person born in that state. One departure that produces caloric taxes for positive ln K (., .)
differences is if richer households obtain fewer calories per Rupee due to non-homotheticities. In this scenario, the true
ln K (., .) difference is more negative than the measured difference if migrant incomes rise upon migration. Second, if
migrants pay slightly higher prices than non-migrants, the caloric advantage of the origin-state bundle over the local
bundle is actually a small disadvantage when priced at the prices migrants actually pay rather than village median
prices I use in ln K (bshareio , Piv ). In support of this explanation, in columns 5 and 8 I find no negative caloric tax for the
third quartile, yet similar results for other quartiles, if I exclude PDS foods or if I calculate calories per Rupee priced at
the median village prices (the two robustness specifications dealing with the concern that migrants paid slightly higher
prices).
43 The fact that the coefficient is substantially smaller than one implies that either migrants adapt their preferences after migrating, or not all household members possess such preferences, or preferences are not of the CobbDouglas/identical-within-state form (or some combination of these three explanations). I will provide some explicit
evidence for the first two of these explanations in later sections.
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migrants from far-off places differ from other migrants in some unobservable way. I address this
concern by including an additional interaction between migranti and the log distance between
the migrant’s destination region (a subset of their state) and their origin state. The coefficient on
the distance interaction is insignificant while the β 2 coefficient is essentially unchanged (column
13 of Table IX). A second concern is that measurement error in ln caloriesi will be correlated with
measurement error in ln K (bshareiv , Piv ) for non-migrant households (recall that ln K (bshareiv , Piv )
is the average calories per Rupee for non-migrants in the village). The average state-round sample contains 3,700 non-migrant households and so any bias due to measurement error should be
small at higher levels of disaggregation. Accordingly, column 14 calculates the ln K (., .) difference
using average bundles at the state level instead of at the village level (still pricing the bundles at
destination-village prices). The β 2 coefficient remains negative and significant in this specification.
In summary, I establish a clear link between the specific preferences of a migrant’s origin-state
and the caloric tax paid by migrants. The size of the tax is larger when a migrant’s origin-state
preferences are badly-suited to the local price vector.

5.4

The size of the caloric tax depends on the intensity of the migrant preferences
In this subsection, I provide further support for a cultural explanation by showing that the

caloric tax paid by migrants is related to the intensity of their preferences for origin-state foods.
Since household preferences for origin-state foods are more intense if multiple household members possess those preferences (as shown in section 5.2), I test the hypothesis that the size of the
caloric tax paid by migrants is larger if both husband and wife are migrants as opposed to just one
of the two.
I interact the migrant terms in the caloric tax specification, equation 1, with the same set of
migrant-structure dummies I used in section 5.2:
ln caloriesi = β 1 migranti × onlyonei + β 2 migranti × bothi

+ β 3 migranti × nospousei + dvt + π1t nospousei + Πt Xi + ε i . (7)
The β coefficients provide separate estimates for the caloric tax faced by migrants for each of these
three structures. Panel 2 of Table VIII reports these regression coefficients. The results mirror the
findings of section 5.2. I find support for the hypothesis that β 2 > β 1 . When only only one of the
husband and wife is a migrant, I obtain a coefficient on the migrant dummy of -0.0125. In contrast,
the size of the caloric tax is significantly more negative when both husband and wife are migrants
(a coefficient of -0.0228).44
Panel 3 of Table VIII performs a similar breakdown for equation 6 of the previous subsection.45
For each of the three migrant structures, I find that the size of the caloric tax is larger when the
44 I

reject the null that the coefficients on migranti × onlyonei and migranti × bothi are equal with a p-value of 5.3.
both head and spouse are migrants but come from different origin states, I take the average value of
1[ln K (bshareio , Piv ) < ln K (bshareiv , Piv )] across the two origin states. Since there are very few such households, results are essentially unchanged if these households are dropped.
45 If
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migrant’s origin-state reference bundle provides fewer calories per Rupee than the local bundle
(both priced at the local price vector). The ordering of the size of the tax is also consistent with the
hypothesis above.46 The most adversely affected households (households in which both husband
and wife migrated to a village where their origin-state reference bundle provides fewer calories
than the local bundle) face a caloric tax of 7.0 percent.
The magnitude of this caloric tax is substantial. The median caloric intake for this migrant subgroup is 2134 calories per person per day with 58 percent of households consuming less than the
recommended calorie norms (2400 calories in rural areas, 2100 in urban). If these migrants had the
same preferences as locals, the median would rise to 2292 calories and the percentage of households below the caloric norms would fall to 47 percent. As with the earlier specifications, these
effects are not limited to better-nourished households. For example, panels 4 through 6 reproduce
the specifications in both this subsection and section 5.2 on the subsample of households consuming fewer than 2000 calories per person per day. The size of the caloric tax for this same group
of households, those in which both husband and wife are migrants with unsuitable preferences,
remains a sizable 5.2 percent (column 2 of panel 6).
In summary, I find strong evidence that culture can constrain caloric intake. I find that migrants
are bringing their food preferences with them, and that the caloric tax is larger when the favored
foods of their origin-state are expensive compared to local alternatives. Further corroborating a
food-culture explanation, the migrant households that pay the largest caloric tax are those with
multiple migrants that possess these unsuitable preferences.

6

Alternative explanations
Up to this point, I have presented a chain of evidence in support of the hypothesis that mi-

grants in India are making nutritionally-suboptimal food choices due to strong preferences for
the favored foods of their origin states. First, I showed that migrants bring their food preferences
with them. Second, I showed a strong link between the size of the caloric tax and the local cost of
the reference bundle of the migrant’s origin state. These findings are inconsistent with a story in
which migrant preferences differ from those of non-migrants but in a manner unrelated to their
cultural origins. However, these findings do not contradict a story where migrants possess better
information or technology, rather than stronger preferences, for the foods of their origin state. I
now discuss these two alternative explanations.

6.1

An information story
The first alternative explanation is that migrants have poor information about local prices or

about the availability and nutritional properties of local alternatives to their origin-state foods.
Under these scenarios, migrants would consume fewer calories per Rupee than non-migrants as
46 I

can reject at the 1 percent level the null that the size of the caloric tax for migrants with unsuited preferences is
the same if only one of the head and spouse are migrants or if both are migrants.
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they are unaware of cheaper alternatives. Migrants may also consume bundles that more closely
resemble their origin-state reference bundle since they are more familiar with these foods. In this
subsection, I provide five pieces of evidence that contradict this information-based explanation
for my findings.
First, I document that the caloric tax is persistent and remains many years after migration.
Even if migrants are initially uninformed, after many years in the destination village they would
become familiar with the local foods and prices. I exploit the data on years since migration and
rerun my main regression specifications on subpopulations that exclude recent migrants. Specifically, I exclude migrant households where the most recent migrant arrived less than 5, 10 or 20
years prior to the survey. Columns 13 to 15 of Table V presents these three regressions for the
basic calorie specification, equation 1. The caloric tax remains significantly negative for the first
two long-term migrant specifications, although the size of the tax declines. When I exclude all
migrants who arrived less than 20 years previously, the tax disappears altogether. However, the
specifications from section 5 tell a more complete story. Although the coefficients are progressively attenuated as I remove the more recent migrants, long-term migrants still consume bundles
more closely related to their origin-state bundle than locals do (columns 13 to 15 of Table VII), and
still pay a caloric tax if they move to locations where their origin-state bundle provides fewer calories per Rupee than the local bundle (columns 13 to 15 of Table X).47 Therefore, even migrants who
have had many years to learn about local foods and prices pay a caloric tax when their origin-state
preferences are unsuited to the local price vector.
Second, I find evidence of a caloric tax on migrants when only one of the husband or wife
are migrants (Panel 1 of Table VIII), and even when wives are moving to their husband’s village
(column 2 of Table IV). In these cases, other household members already possess information
about local foods and prices yet the caloric tax remains.
Third, in Indian society it is typically women who are in charge of the purchase and preparation of foods. Therefore, under an information-driven story the caloric tax should be stronger if
wives rather than husbands are migrants. On the other hand, in traditional societies such as India,
men typically have greater bargaining power in household decision making; therefore, under a
preference-driven story, the caloric impacts due to a migrant in the household will be stronger if
the husband is a migrant as opposed to the wife. I evaluate these two competing hypotheses. Panels 1 to 3 of Table XI present similar specifications to Table VIII but break the “only one” category
into two categories: only the head is a migrant and only the spouse is a migrant. I find no support
for the information-driven prior. In fact, across each of the three regressions, the ordering of the
coefficients across these two categories is in accordance with the preference-driven prior above
(i.e. I find larger correlations and caloric taxes if the husband is a migrant as opposed to the wife).
For example, in Panel 2, the size of the caloric tax if only the spouse is a migrant is around 1.0 percent and rises to 1.9 percent when only the husband is a migrant.48 One possible explanation for
47 For

migrants who left 20 or more years ago the size of the tax is 1.79 percent (significant at the 1 percent level).

48 I can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on only spouse is equal or greater that the coefficient on only head at

the 6 percent level. Similarly, I can reject at the 5 percent level the same hypothesis in panel 3 for migrants who move
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these findings is that the husband’s mother is in charge of household food purchases and preparation and that husbands bring their mothers with them when they migrate. Under this scenario,
I would find larger caloric taxes if the husband is a migrant even under a pure information story.
However, the husband’s mother is only present in 13.6 percent of households where the husband
and not the spouse is a migrant and, as shown in panels 4 to 6, results are essentially unchanged
when these households are excluded.
Fourth, if the explanation is that migrants have poor information, the migrant tax is likely to
be smaller among literate segments of the population who can acquire information more easily.
I find the opposite relationship in the data. Column 16 of Tables V, VII and X restrict attention
to households in which the household head is literate. The size of the caloric tax actually grows
larger when I focus on this subpopulation.
Finally, inconsistent with a story where migrants are simply unaware of local alternatives, I
present evidence that migrants do adjust their purchasing behavior when their origin-state preferences are particularly unsuited to the local price vector (e.g. when their origin-state bundle is
more costly than the local bundle). I return to the preference-similarity regression, equation 4,
and interact the migrant dummy with an indicator for a negative value of [ln K (bshareio , Piv ) −
ln K (bshareiv , Piv )]. I report this regression in column 11 of table VI. I find a significantly negative coefficient on the double interaction migrantiov × 1[ln K (bshareio , Piv ) < ln K (bshareiv , Piv )]
corresponding to a 50 percent decline in the effect size. Therefore, migrants seem to be aware
that substituting away from their origin-state foods can improve nutrition since they moderate
their consumption choices in contexts where consumption of these foods is most disadvantageous.
However, the adaptation is incomplete (i.e. the sum of the coefficient on the double interaction
and the coefficient on migrantiov is still positive and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level). Even in contexts where their origin-state preferences are calorically disadvantageous,
migrant households still consume bundles that more closely resemble the bundles consumed in
their origin state (consistent with my previous finding that these migrant households consume
fewer calories than locals).

6.2

A technology story
The second alternative explanation is that migrants do not possess the technologies to make

high-quality meals using the locally-cheap foods. These technologies encompass cooking and
food-preparation equipment as well as recipes and techniques that turn raw foods into enjoyable
meals. For example, a family in Punjab may be expert at transforming wheat into delicious roti (a
flat bread), but may lack the training or equipment to make a tasty dosa (a rice-based pancake). If
the family migrated to Kerala, they may continue to consume wheat as they enjoy well-prepared
meals over badly-prepared meals rather than wheat over rice.
Once more the evidence from various subpopulations in the data contradicts a story in which
technology is the sole explanation for my findings. If technology was responsible, the caloric
to locations where their origin-state bundle provides fewer calories than the local bundle.
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tax should disappear for long-term migrants. These households have spent many years away,
providing a sufficient time frame over which to purchase new equipment as well as learn new
recipes and techniques. Similarly, there should be no tax for migrants who are moving into a
non-migrant household since in these households there should be appropriate kitchen equipment
already present and migrants can learn recipes and preparation techniques from other household
members. Finally, as discussed above, women are typically in charge of food preparation in Indian
households. Therefore, if a lack of recipes and preparation techniques were the cause of the caloric
tax, the tax should be smaller when only the husband is a migrant compared to when only the
wife is a migrant. As shown in the previous subsection, I find substantial caloric taxes for all these
subpopulations and a larger tax for migrant husbands than for migrant wives.

7

Conclusion and policy implications
This paper sets out to answer a simple question: do food cultures matter in an economic sense,

and in particular, can culture constrain caloric intake and contribute to malnutrition? I address this
question by exploiting the fact that migrants and non-migrants face the same relative prices, yet
possess very different preferences. Drawing on detailed household survey data from India, I find
that inter-state migrants consume fewer calories per Rupee of food expenditure compared to their
non-migrant neighbors. This caloric tax on migrants corresponds to 1.6 percent of caloric intake
and is evident even for households on the edge of malnutrition. I then provide a chain of evidence
in support of an explanation based on culture: that migrants make nutritionally-suboptimal food
choices due to strong preferences for the favored foods of their origin states. First, I document that
migrants bring their origin-state food preferences with them when they migrate and that these
preferences are stronger when there are more migrants in the household. Second, I show that the
heterogeneity in the size of the migrant caloric tax is related to the suitability and intensity of these
origin-state food preferences. The most adversely affected migrants (households in which both
husband and wife migrated to a village where their origin-state preferences are unsuited to the
local price vector) would consume 7 percent more calories if they possessed the same preferences
as their neighbors.
These results provide insight into the value that households place on their culture. Even households on the edge of malnutrition, a population for which reductions in caloric intake have serious
repercussions for both health and economic well-being, are willing to substantially reduce their
caloric intake in order to accommodate their cultural food preferences.
In terms of policy, the finding that culture can constrain caloric intake has important implications for tackling hunger and malnutrition. The cultural causes of hunger need to be understood
when designing programs to alleviate malnutrition. Three types of program are particularly relevant: programs that provide food aid or price subsidies to consumers; programs that reduce tariffs
or use other trade policies to increase food imports; and programs that aim to develop bio-fortified
or high-yield crop varieties. In all three cases, the programs will be more effective if the targeted
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foods are those favored by households on the edge of malnutrition.
As a concrete example, white maize is greatly preferred to yellow maize in much of Africa.49
However, much food aid to Africa comes in the form of imported yellow maize, and vitamin-A
bio-fortification currently involves the addition of carotenes which turn the maize yellow-orange.
Programs that provide cheap yellow maize to hungry communities, or try to reduce vitaminA deficiency through wider availability of bio-fortified maize, are less effective in contexts where
there are cultural preferences for white maize. Food vouchers that allow consumers to choose their
favored foods or bio-fortification of traditional foods may prove more successful in such cases.
Similarly, the introduction of high-yield varieties (HYV) of rice, wheat and yellow maize spurred
“the green revolution” in much of the developing world. However, this revolution bypassed SubSaharan Africa. Alongside a range of other factors, adoption of these three HYV crops was held
back by strong local preferences for Sub-Saharan staples such as sweet potato, cassava, sorghum,
teff and white maize.50
Another potential remedy, and one mooted by the Bengal Famine Inquiry Commission, involves facilitating preference changes through campaigns that encourage the consumption of alternative foods. The commission notes that such a campaign was implemented in Ceylon with
some success in order to increase Australian wheat consumption following the blockage of rice
imports during World War II. However, efforts may be better targeted at children who have lessrigid preferences and even then may be slow to yield results:
As long as rice is available, rice eaters in general will consume it in preference to other
grains and in such circumstances “eat more wheat” campaigns are not likely to be very
effective. ... If school-feeding schemes are developed, alternative cereals could be used
for school meals. ... Further, if children learn to take such foods, they may carry the
preference into later life. Children are more flexible in their dietary habits than adults.
Whatever methods are adopted in the attempt to encourage the use of wheat in place
of rice, progress is likely to be slow. (Famine Inquiry Commission, 1945)
A fruitful avenue for further research would be to explore the dynamics of food cultures and to
better understand how nutritionally-beneficial preferences develop.

49 See

(McCann, 2005) for the historical origins of this preference for white maize. Muzhingi et al. (2008) and
De Groote and Kimenju (2008) provide empirical evidence for this preference ordering.
50 See Paarlberg (2010) for a more complete discussion of the reasons for the failure of Africa’s green revolution.
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Figure I: Caloric intake under actual and hypothetical preferences for rice and wheat
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Note: The upper panel displays the counterfactual distribution of caloric intake if households switched the quantities
purchased of rice and wheat where advantageous, spending any cost savings on the cheaper of the two foods. The
distribution includes all households in the 22,148 villages where I observe both rice and wheat purchases in the two
survey rounds. The lower panel displays a histogram of the caloric gains available to the switchers in the counterfactual
exercise.
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Figure II: Regional consumption patterns for rice and wheat
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calories from rice and wheat for the 22,148 villages where I observe both rice and wheat purchases in the two survey
rounds. The lower panel highlights the observations for villages in Kerala and Punjab.
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0.112
0.000

Only spouse is
migrant
0.413
0.807

1.000
0.487

Proportion of full
sample

Consuming below
2000 calories per
capita per day
0.433
0.436

Consuming below
2400/2100 calories
(rural/urban)
0.566
0.591

10 to 20 years
0.293
0.320

0.132
0.000

Only head is migrant

0.778
0.847

Both migrants
(different state)
0.019
0.020

Proportion of
migrants - rural
households
0.459
0.576

Below median per Below 25th percentile
capita expenditure
of per capita
expenditure
0.307
0.126
0.369
0.164

20 or more years
0.413
0.470

Both migrants
(same state)
0.324
0.173

0.061
0.061

Proportion of sample Proportion of sample
-rural
- migrant households

Note: Table shows the proportion of the sample households in various categories. All proportions use the household weights provided by the NSS.

Migrant breakdown by per capita expenditure and nutrition
Consuming below
1850 calories per
capita per day
Full Sample
0.338
Wife moved for marriage sample
0.338

Migrant breakdown by years since migration (most recent migrant in household)
0 to 4 years
5 to 9 years
Full Sample
0.152
0.141
Wife moved for marriage sample
0.072
0.137

Full Sample
Wife moved for marriage sample

Migrant breakdown by within-household migrant structure
No spouse

Full sample
Wife moved for marriage sample

Number of
households
(unweighted)
240,081
93,823

Table I: Sample descriptive statistics
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Origin State
State
State
State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Total
Name
No.
Size
A&N Islands
1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
0.0
Andhra Pradesh
2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4
8.2
Arunachal
3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.1
Assam
4
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5
2.2
Bihar
5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.8 10.1
Chandigarh
6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9
0.1
Dadra & N Haveli
7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
Delhi
8
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 4.1 0.2 8.8
0.9
Goa, Daman & Diu
9
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
0.2
Gujarat
10 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 3.2
4.7
Haryana
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 6.9
2.0
Himachal Pradesh
12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
0.6
Jamu & Kashmir
13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
0.9
Karnataka
14 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.4
5.4
Kerala
15 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
3.4
Lakshdweep
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
Madhya Pradesh
17 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.2 7.4
8.0
Maharashtra
18 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.9 0.3 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.9 0.2 12.4 8.9
Manipur
19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.2
Meghalaya
20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.2
Mizoram
21 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.1
Nagaland
22 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
Orissa
23 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4
4.0
Pondicherry
24 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
0.1
Punjab
25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 5.7
2.6
Rajasthan
26 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.7 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.2 8.1
5.0
Sikkim
27 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
0.0
TamilNadu
28 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.5
7.2
Tripura
29 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.3
Uttar Pradesh
30 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 2.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 11.5 16.5
West Bengal
31 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.0 9.5
8.2
Total 0.2 4.9 0.2 1.8 10.1 0.4 0.0 3.2 0.4 4.4 6.9 1.7 1.0 6.1 3.0 0.0 7.1 6.9 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 1.8 0.5 5.1 7.8 0.2 5.1 0.5 15.8 4.0 100 100
State Size (NSS sample) 0.0 8.2 0.1 2.2 10.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 4.7 2.0 0.6 0.9 5.4 3.4 0.0 8.0 8.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 4.0 0.1 2.6 5.0 0.0 7.2 0.3 16.5 8.2 100

Table II: Proportion of migrant households by migration route

household weights provided by the NSS.

(the rows). The State Size row and column reports the proportion of all households currently living in each state at the time of the surveys. All proportions use the

Note: Each cell of the table shows the proportion of all migrants households that moved from a particular origin state (the columns) to a particular destination state

Destination State

Table III: Differences between migrant and non-migrant households

Log caloric intake per person per day
Log household per capita expenditure
(Rupees, 30 days)

Log food expenditure
(Rupees, 30 days)

Log household size
Proportion males 0-4
Proportion females 0-4
Proportion males 5-9
Proportion females 5-9
Proportion males 10-14
Proportion females 10-14
Proportion males 15-55
Proportion females 15-55
Proportion males over 55
Proportion females over 55
Rural self-employed in non-agriculture
Urban self-employed
Rural agricultural labor
Urban wage earner
Rural other labor
Urban casual labor
Rural self-employed in agriculture
Rural other
Urban other
Log price paid (no controls)

(1)
Mean (full sample)

(2)
Migrant difference
(full sample)

7.6286

0.0133***

(3)
Migrant difference
(wife moved for
marriage sample)
0.0034

(0.3712)

(0.0049)

(0.0080)

4.8272

0.0624***

0.0423***

(0.5816)

(0.0069)

(0.0108)

4.4205

0.0460***

0.0272***

(0.5045)

(0.0059)

(0.0094)

1.7522

-0.0314***

0.0001

(0.4848)

(0.0068)

(0.0104)

0.0677

0.0025

0.0034

(0.1043)

(0.0015)

(0.0026)

0.0634

0.0021

0.0044*

(0.1020)

(0.0014)

(0.0024)

0.0722

-0.0007

-0.0023

(0.1055)

(0.0014)

(0.0024)

0.0656

-0.0001

-0.0002

(0.1004)

(0.0015)

(0.0025)

0.0666

-0.0007

-0.0030

(0.1052)

(0.0014)

(0.0024)

0.0575

-0.0006

-0.0027

(0.0962)

(0.0013)

(0.0022)

0.2701

0.0113***

0.0023

(0.1596)

(0.0023)

(0.0030)

0.2625

-0.0089***

-0.0016

(0.1339)

(0.0017)

(0.0026)

0.0375

-0.0013

-0.0007

(0.0875)

(0.0011)

(0.0017)

0.0370

-0.0036***

0.0005

(0.0917)

(0.0010)

(0.0016)

0.0972

0.0036

0.0041

(0.2963)

(0.0038)

(0.0068)

0.0158***

0.0853

0.0212***

(0.2793)

(0.0043)

(0.0060)

0.2151

-0.0110**

-0.0160*

(0.4109)

(0.0044)

(0.0085)

0.0513

-0.0054*

-0.0022

(0.2207)

(0.0031)

(0.0042)

0.0553

0.0069**

-0.0006

(0.2286)

(0.0028)

(0.0046)

0.0143

-0.0037**

-0.0010

(0.1188)

(0.0018)

(0.0023)

0.3464

-0.0075

-0.0016

(0.4758)

(0.0049)

(0.0097)

0.0141***

0.0643

0.0080**

(0.2453)

(0.0031)

(0.0049)

0.0707

-0.0120***

-0.0126***

(0.2564)

(0.0033)

(0.0046)

0.6458

0.00341***

-0.00033

(Rupees per 1000 calories)

(1.0874)

(0.00115)

(0.00204)

Log price paid (food expenditure controls)

0.6451

0.00154

-0.00137

(Rupees per 1000 calories)

(1.0876)

(0.00113)

(0.00202)

0.6447

0.00102

-0.00184

(1.0874)

(0.00112)

(0.00202)

Log price paid (controls)
(Rupees per 1000 calories)

Note: Column 1 shows the mean of each household-level variable in the row title. Column 2 shows the coefficient on a
migrant dummy when the variable is regressed on a village-round fixed effect and a migrant-status dummy. Column 3
shows the coefficient for the same regression but restricting attention to households in the “wife moved for marriage sample”
described in the text. The last three rows show the coefficient on a migrant dummy from a regression of log unit values for
every product purchased on product-village-round fixed effects and a migrant-status dummy. The “controls” row includes
the same vector of controls for log per-capita food expenditure and household characteristics used in all later regressions,
while the “food expenditure controls” row just uses a cubic in log household food expenditure per capita. Regressions are
weighted using household weights except the last three rows that use budget shares interacted with household weights.
Regressions clustered at the level of the fixed effects. * signifies significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level
and *** at the 1 percent level.
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Specification:
-0.0159***
(0.00326)
235,126
0.732
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Wife moved
for marriage
sample
-0.0121***
(0.00356)
91,406
0.718
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Baseline
Specification

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Dependent variable: Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Total expenditure
Real food
State-specific Food expenditure PDS foods (rice,
controls
expenditure
food expenditure instrumented wheat and sugar)
controls
controls
excluded
-0.0136***
-0.0117***
-0.0168***
-0.0118***
-0.0205***
(0.00442)
(0.00418)
(0.00316)
(0.00332)
(0.00505)
235,104
235,122
235,126
234,961
237,328
0.520
0.676
0.723
0.711
0.729
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(8)
(9)
Dependent variable: Log calories
per Rupee of food expenditure
Baseline
Priced at village
Specification
median prices
-0.0145***
-0.0149***
(0.00322)
(0.00351)
235,104
235,104
0.325
0.306
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

System. All regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. * signifies

polynomial in total food expenditure with a polynomial in total non-food expenditure. Column 7 excludes the foods commonly sold through the Public Distribution

order polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure (bar columns 3 to 5 and columns 8 to 9 which use alternate expenditure controls). Column 6 instruments the

All specifications include village-round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics and type as well as a third-

of the household head moved village at the time of marriage and compares wives who moved interstate (migrants) to those who moved intrastate (non-migrants).

variable migranti is a dummy for whether the household head or their spouse is an interstate migrant. Column 2 restricts attention to households in which the wife

expenditure and for column 9 is log caloric intake per Rupee of food expenditure where calories are priced at the village median price for each food. Independent

Note: Dependent variable for columns 1-7 is log caloric intake per person per day. Dependent variable for column 8 is log caloric intake per Rupee of actual food

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Total Expenditure Controls
Real Food Expenditure Controls
State-Specific Food Expenditure Controls
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Village-Round FE

migrant i

(2)

(1)

Table IV: Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Non-Migrants
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Consuming < 1850
calories per day
-0.0120**
(0.00495)
67,116
0.625
Yes
Yes
Yes
(10)

Baseline
Specification
-0.0159***
(0.00326)
235,126
0.732
Yes
Yes
Yes
(9)

Below median per
capita food expend.
-0.0147**
(0.00581)
86,531
0.643
Yes
Yes
Yes

(7)

-0.0171***
(0.00401)
128,706
0.732
Yes
Yes
Yes

Literate

(16)

Bottom quartile per
capita food expend.
-0.00981
(0.00703)
36,921
0.633
Yes
Yes
Yes

(8)

at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. * signifies significance

well as a third-order polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure. The column headings denote the various subpopulations on which the regressions are run. All

an interstate migrant. All specifications include village-round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics and type as

Note: Dependent variable is log caloric intake per person per day. Independent variable migranti is a dummy for whether the household head or their spouse is

(11)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Dependent variable: Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Consuming < 2000 Consuming < 2400
Below median per Bottom quartile per
calories per day
(rural) 2100 (urban) capita expenditure
capita expenditure
-0.0145***
-0.0158***
-0.0107**
-0.0141
(0.00440)
(0.00414)
(0.00471)
(0.00865)
89,886
131,149
87,010
36,436
0.626
0.640
0.674
0.689
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
Dependent variable: Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Children under 5 in Children under 5 and Children under 16 in Children under 16
Migrated 5 or more Migrated 10 or more Migrated 20 or more
Sample:
household
below median food
household
and below median
years ago
years ago
years ago
expend.
food expend.
migrant i
-0.0132***
-0.0141**
-0.0169***
-0.0140***
-0.0114***
-0.00650**
0.00183
(0.00461)
(0.00715)
(0.00330)
(0.00533)
(0.00335)
(0.00323)
(0.00421)
Observations
103,652
47,881
178,456
75,644
231,268
228,442
223,489
Within R-squared
0.700
0.630
0.713
0.637
0.732
0.732
0.732
Food Expenditure Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village-Round FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Village-Round FE

migrant i

Sample:

(2)

(1)

Table V: Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Non-Migrants: Subpopulations

42

𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑜 + 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜

226,472
0.007
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

0.123***
(0.0146)

All Households

(2)

235,126
0.080
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

-0.0111***
(0.00199)

(3)
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑑 of
household i budget
shares with budget
shares of current state d

0.0226***
(0.00290)
108,743
0.098
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

0.0103***
(0.00284)
23,397
0.062
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

108,743
0.060
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

(12)
Correlation of household
caloric shares with caloric
shares of origin states o v
0.0263***
(0.00334)

0.0225***
(0.00293)
108,726
0.074
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

(4)
(5)
(6)
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣 of household i budget shares with the average budget shares of
the origin states o v of migrants in village (169 foods)
Baseline Specification Wife moved for marriage Total expenditure controls
sample

(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣 of household i budget shares with the average budget shares of the origin states o v
Real food expenditure
State-specific food
PDS foods (rice, wheat
Reference basket
Interactions with lnK
controls
expenditure controls
and sugar) excluded
by income quartile
difference
0.0215***
0.0223***
0.0171***
0.0217***
0.0272***
(0.00299)
(0.00296)
(0.00287)
(0.00245)
(0.00382)
-0.0147**
(0.00618)
108,737
108,743
108,696
108,638
105,810
0.135
0.066
0.104
0.092
0.096
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(7)

14,156
0.065
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

0.189***
(0.0204)

Migrant Households Only

𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖

Rice expenditure share
𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖

(1)

percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. * signifies significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5

of 1 if the migrant’s origin-state bundle provide fewer calories than the local bundle, and column 12 uses caloric shares in lieu of budget shares for the dependent variable. All regressions

column 10 matches households to a reference basket calculated separately by income-quartile, column 11 includes an additional interaction with an indicator variable that takes the value

controls). Column 5 restricts attention to households with wives who moved at the time of marriage, column 9 excludes the foods commonly sold through the Public Distribution System,

specific controls for household size, demographics and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure (bar columns 6 to 8 which use alternate expenditure

whether the household head or their spouse is an interstate migrant from ov ). All specifications include either village-round or village-ov -round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-

mean budget shares for non-migrant households in state ov , where state ov is the origin state of a migrant in the household’s village. The independent variable is migrantiov (a dummy for

in household i’s current state d, on a migrant dummy. Dependent variable in columns 4 to 11 is the correlation between household i’s vector of food budget shares and the vector of

attention only to migrants). Column 3 regresses ρid , the correlation between household i’s vector of food budget shares and the vector of mean budget shares of non-migrant households

Note: Columns 1 and 2 regress the share of household rice and wheat expenditures spent on rice on the average rice share of the household’s origin state (with column 1 restricting

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Alternative Expnediture Controls
Demographics/Household Type
Village-o v -Round FE

𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑣 ×
𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

𝑜

𝑜

𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑣

Dependent variable:

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Alternative Expnediture Controls
Demographics/Household Type
Village-Round FE
Village-o v -Round FE

𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑣

𝑜

𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖

𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑜

Dependent variable:

Table VI: Comparing Bundles of Migrants and Non-Migrants
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𝑜

level. * signifies significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

the regressions are run. All regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state

demographics and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure. The column headings denote the various subpopulations on which

their spouse is an interstate migrant from ov ). All specifications include village-ov -round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size,

state ov , where state ov is the origin-state of a migrant in the household’s village. The independent variable is migrantiov (a dummy for whether the household head or

Note: Dependent variable is the correlation between household i’s vector of food budget shares and the vector of mean budget shares for non-migrant households in

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
Dependent variable: Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣 of household i budget shares with the average budget shares of the origin states o v of migrants in village (169 foods)
Children under 5 in Children under 5 Children under 16 Children under 16 Migrated 5 or more
Migrated 10 or
Migrated 20 or
Literate
Sample:
household
and below median
in household
and below median
years ago
more years ago
more years ago
food expend.
food expend.
𝑜
0.0183***
0.0114**
0.0191***
0.00875**
0.0216***
0.0209***
0.0187***
0.0257***
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖 𝑣
(0.00359)
(0.00469)
(0.00273)
(0.00407)
(0.00275)
(0.00283)
(0.00385)
(0.00320)
Observations
41,718
12,628
76,074
20,407
99,383
93,185
82,590
76,684
Within R-squared
0.073
0.113
0.066
0.093
0.093
0.093
0.092
0.125
Food Expenditure Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Demographics/Household Type
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village-o v -Round FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Demographics/Household Type
Village-o v -Round FE

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖 𝑣

Sample:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Dependent variable: Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣 of household i budget shares with the average budget shares of the origin states o v of migrants in village (169 foods)
Baseline
Consuming < 1850 Consuming < 2000 Consuming < 2400 Below median per Bottom quartile per Below median per Bottom quartile per
Specification
calories per day
calories per day (rural) 2100 (urban) capita expenditure capita expenditure capita food expend. capita food expend.
0.0226***
0.0196***
0.0213***
0.0213***
0.00646**
0.00142
0.00900**
0.00312
(0.00290)
(0.00367)
(0.00348)
(0.00352)
(0.00314)
(0.00694)
(0.00392)
(0.00688)
108,743
28,560
38,666
50,925
21,179
7,326
23,165
8,445
0.098
0.121
0.115
0.105
0.090
0.100
0.102
0.104
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

(3)

-0.0123***
(0.00470)
-0.00252
(0.00687)
-0.0247**
(0.0101)

migrant i

migrant i

Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

(5)

(6)

-0.00447
(0.00721)
-0.0494***
(0.0170)

-0.0151**
(0.00716)

0.0375***
(0.00610)

Both migrants

-0.00886
(0.00675)
-0.0628***
(0.0144)

-0.0228***
(0.00570)

0.0416***
(0.00453)

Both migrants

-0.0101
(0.0101)
-0.0517**
(0.0228)

-0.0286***
(0.00865)

0.0348***
(0.00876)

No spouse

0.00246
(0.00675)
-0.0487***
(0.0124)

-0.0139**
(0.00618)

0.0331***
(0.00819)

No spouse

89,596

89,886

38,666

Observations

234,155

235,126

108,743

Observations

0.626

0.626

0.117

Within
R-squared

0.732

0.732

0.100

Within
R-squared

and origin-state level. * signifies significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

households where the head has no spouse. All regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round

survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure and a dummy for

VI, Panels 1 and 4 include village-ov -round fixed effects. As in Tables IV and IX, Panels 2-3 and 5-6 include village-round fixed effects. All panels include flexible

no spouse. Each panel comprises one regression. Panels 4-6 restrict attention to households consuming fewer than 2000 calories per person per day. As in Table

mutually-exclusive categories of within-household migrant structure: only one of head or spouse is a migrant, both head and spouse are migrants, and there is

Note: Panels 1-6 repeat the regressions shown in Tables IV, VI and IX but interacting every instance of a migrant dummy variable with indicator variables for three

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

0.00778*
(0.00398)

𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑣

Dependent variable:
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣

(4)

𝑜

Variable interacted with
migrant-structure dummies

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

Only head or
spouse is migrant

-0.00351
(0.00374)
-0.0188***
(0.00521)

migrant i

Subsample of households consuming
less than 2000 calories per person day

-0.0125***
(0.00292)

migrant i

Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

(2)

migrant i

0.00786***
(0.00251)

𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑣

Only head or
spouse is migrant

Dependent variable:
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣

𝑜

Variable interacted with
migrant-structure dummies

(1)

Full sample of households

Table VIII: Results broken-down by within-household migrant structure
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91,158
0.718
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Wife moved for
marriage sample
-0.00117
(0.00514)
-0.0220***
(0.00763)

(10)

(9)

234,135
0.521
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

234,153
0.676
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

(11)

0.0629***
(0.0115)
234,157
0.731
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
236,323
0.729
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

236,323
0.729
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

-0.0820***
(0.0117)
-0.0303***
(0.0105)
0.00708
(0.00662)
0.0366***
(0.00656)

PDS foods
excluded

(5)

234,157
0.723
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

233,993
0.711
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

(12)
(13)
Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Total expenditure
Real food
State-specific food Food expenditure
controls
expenditure controls expenditure controls
instrumented
-0.00260
-0.00303
-0.00572
-0.00242
(0.00510)
(0.00579)
(0.00436)
(0.00437)
-0.0285***
-0.0222***
-0.0289***
-0.0241***
(0.00643)
(0.00680)
(0.00622)
(0.00583)

234,157
0.732
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

-0.0393***
(0.00555)
-0.0191***
(0.00483)
-0.0136***
(0.00516)
0.0227***
(0.00575)

(0.00446)
-0.0823***
(0.0125)

(3)
(4)
Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Quartiles of lnK
PDS foods
lnK difference
difference
excluded
interaction
0.00611

(2)

234,157
0.731
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Baseline
Specification
-0.00498
(0.00433)
-0.0283***
(0.00607)

(1)

(15)

234,135
0.307
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

(16)

234,135
0.307
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

231,774
0.731
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

(0.00382)
213,444
0.732
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

235,004
0.732
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Reference basket Log migrant travel Reference basket by
by income quartile distance interactions destination state
-0.00746
0.0171
-0.00879*
(0.00475)
(0.0218)
(0.00533)
-0.0246***
-0.0267***
-0.0136**
(0.00658)
(0.00629)
(0.00643)
-0.00413

(14)

234,135
0.325
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)
(7)
(8)
Log calories per Rupee of food expenditure
Baseline
Prices at Village
Prices at Village
Specification
Median Prices
Median Prices
-0.00010
-0.00369
(0.00440)
(0.00417)
-0.0280***
-0.0376***
(0.00645)
(0.00647)
-0.0435***
(0.00766)
-0.0208***
(0.00443)
-0.00736
(0.00539)
0.0303***
(0.00574)

two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. * signifies significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

region and their origin state. Column 16 uses a state-specific reference bundle for the local bundle. All regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are

Column 14 matches households to a reference basket calculated separately by income-quartile. Column 15 includes an interaction with the distance between a migrant’s destination

in which the wife moved village at the time of marriage and compares interstate to intrastate movers. Column 13 instruments total food expenditure with total non-food expenditure.

alternative functions of these calorie differences. Columns 4 and 5 exclude the foods commonly sold through the Public Distribution System. Column 9 restricts attention to households

per-capita food expenditure (except columns 6 to 8 and columns 10 to 12 which use alternate expenditure controls). Column 1 reports the baseline specification. Columns 2 and 3 use

All specifications include village-round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log

reference bundle from the migrant’s origin state provides fewer calories than a 1 Rupee reference bundle from the migrant’s destination village (both priced at destination-village prices).

median prices in the latter two cases). Independent variables are migranti , a migrant household dummy, and migranti interacted with with an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 1 Rupee

Note: Dependent variable is log caloric intake per person per day (except columns 6 to 8 where it is log caloric intake per Rupee of food expenditure, with calories priced at village

× lndistance ov
Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Alternative Expnediture Controls
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Village-Round FE

migrant i

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

migrant i

Specification:

Dependent variable:

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Alternative Expnediture Controls
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Village-Round FE

× (ln𝐾(𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 )−ln𝐾(𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ))

migrant i
× 1st quartile [lnK (.,.)-lnK (.,.)]
migrant i
× 2nd quartile [lnK (.,.)-lnK (.,.)]
migrant i
× 3rd quartile [lnK (.,.)-lnK (.,.)]
migrant i
× 4th quartile [lnK (.,.)-lnK (.,.)]
migrant i

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

migrant i

Specification:

Dependent variable:

Table IX: Comparing the Caloric Intake of Migrants and Non-Migrants across Migration Routes

46
0.00290
(0.00597)
-0.0364***
(0.00811)
103,325
0.699
Yes
Yes
Yes

Children under 5 in
household

(10)

(9)

(11)

Below median per
capita food expend.
-0.000500
(0.00910)
-0.0220**
(0.00868)
86,378
0.643
Yes
Yes
Yes

(7)

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
Dependent variable: Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Children under 5 and Children under 16 in Children under 16
Migrated 5 or more Migrated 10 or more Migrated 20 or more
below median food
household
and below median
years ago
years ago
years ago
expend.
food expend.
0.00296
-0.00588
0.000205
-0.00100
0.00454
0.0149***
(0.0116)
(0.00403)
(0.00829)
(0.00412)
(0.00395)
(0.00458)
-0.0266**
-0.0270***
-0.0217**
-0.0264***
-0.0276***
-0.0328***
(0.0130)
(0.00589)
(0.00889)
(0.00639)
(0.00644)
(0.00882)
47,784
177,897
75,507
230,547
227,894
223,220
0.629
0.713
0.637
0.732
0.732
0.732
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Consuming < 1850
calories per day
-0.000922
(0.00676)
-0.0329***
(0.0103)
66,899
0.624
Yes
Yes
Yes

Baseline
Specification
-0.00498
(0.00433)
-0.0283***
(0.00607)
234,157
0.731
Yes
Yes
Yes

(4)
(5)
(6)
Dependent variable: Log caloric intake (per person per day)
Consuming < 2000
Consuming < 2400
Below median per
Bottom quartile per
calories per day
(rural) 2100 (urban)
capita expenditure
capita expenditure
-0.00412
-0.00560
0.00347
0.0281
(0.00578)
(0.00547)
(0.00754)
(0.0194)
-0.0304***
-0.0249***
-0.0222**
-0.0547***
(0.00796)
(0.00696)
(0.00908)
(0.0189)
89,596
130,770
86,877
36,390
0.626
0.640
0.674
0.689
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)

-0.0108**
(0.00526)
-0.0223***
(0.00848)
128,026
0.731
Yes
Yes
Yes

Literate

(16)

Bottom quartile per
capita food expend.
0.0242
(0.0175)
-0.0449**
(0.0188)
36,869
0.633
Yes
Yes
Yes

(8)

level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. * signifies significance at the 10 percent

polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure. The column headings denote the various subpopulations on which the regressions are run. All regressions are

specifications include village-round fixed effects and flexible survey-round-specific controls for household size, demographics and type as well as a third-order

migrant’s origin-state provides fewer calories than a 1 Rupee reference bundle from the migrant’s destination village both priced at destination-village prices. All

or their spouse is an interstate migrant, and migranti interacted with with an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a 1 Rupee reference bundle from the

Note: Dependent variable for all columns is log caloric intake per person per day. Independent variables are migranti , a dummy for whether the household head

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Village-Round FE

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

migrant i

Sample:

Observations
Within R-squared
Food Expenditure Controls
Demographics/Household Type Controls
Village-Round FE

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

migrant i

Sample:

(2)

(1)
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Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

(3)

Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

(6)

Only spouse is
migrant

-0.00753
(0.00599)
-0.0253***
(0.00920)
Only head is
migrant and no
mother in house

migrant i

-0.0141***
(0.00476)
-0.00340
(0.00596)
-0.0236***
(0.00826)

migrant i

migrant i

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

0.0123**
(0.00483)

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖 𝑣

𝑜

Variable interacted with
migrant-structure dummies

× 𝟏[ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑜𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 < ln𝐾 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝑣𝑖 , 𝑷𝑣𝑖 ]

migrant i

-0.00189
(0.00427)
-0.0173***
(0.00608)

-0.0186***
(0.00479)

migrant i

-0.00190
(0.00427)
-0.0172***
(0.00608)

-0.0103***
(0.00323)

0.00713***
(0.00267)

-0.0103***
(0.00323)

0.00715***
(0.00267)

0.00982**
(0.00459)

𝑜

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖 𝑣

Only spouse is
migrant

Only head is
migrant

Variable interacted with
migrant-structure dummies

-0.0101
(0.00665)
-0.0613***
(0.0135)

-0.0244***
(0.00549)

0.0388***
(0.00486)

Both migrants or
migrant head with
mother in house

-0.00901
(0.00677)
-0.0628***
(0.0144)

-0.0230***
(0.00570)

0.0416***
(0.00454)

Both migrants

0.00232
(0.00676)
-0.0486***
(0.0124)

-0.0142**
(0.00617)

234,155

235,126

108,743

Observations

No spouse

0.0330***
(0.00819)

234,155

235,126

108,743

Observations

0.00233
(0.00677)
-0.0487***
(0.0124)

-0.0141**
(0.00619)

0.0331***
(0.00820)

No spouse

0.732

0.732

0.100

Within
R-squared

0.732

0.732

0.100

Within
R-squared

at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.

regressions are weighted using household weights and the standard errors are two-way clustered at the village-round and origin-state level. * signifies significance

size, demographics and type as well as a third-order polynomial in log per-capita food expenditure and a dummy for households where the head has no spouse. All

live in the house (with households where the mother is present placed in the both category). All panels include flexible survey-round-specific controls for household

Panels 4-6 repeat the same exercise but replace the only-head indicator with an indicator for households where only the head is a migrant and his mother does not

and there is no spouse. Each panel comprises one regression. Panel 1 includes village-ov -round fixed effects, and Panel 2 and 3 include village-round fixed effects.

mutually-exclusive categories of within-household migrant structure: only the head is a migrant, only the spouse is a migrant, both head and spouse are migrants,

Note: Panels 1-3 repeat the regressions shown in Tables IV, VI and IX but interacting every instance of a migrant dummy variable with indicator variables for four

Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

Dependent variable:
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣

(5)

(4)

Full sample of households

Dependent variable:
Log caloric intake

Dependent variable:
Correlation 𝜌𝑖𝑜𝑣

(2)

(1)

Full sample of households

Table XI: Results broken-down by whether husband or wife is a migrant

